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Abstract
The following paper looks at intelligence failures and military failures through the
lens of adaptation failure. This paper asserts that there is reason to believe that certain
causal elements of alleged intelligence failures reside more so in the province of politics,
than in the collection and analysis domain of intelligence tradecraft. This is not to say
that failures are exclusively of a political nature, but that looking at politics and the
relationship of policymakers to the Intelligence Community yields a preponderance of
causal evidence. Secondly, it is suggested that a parallel set of underlying assumptions
evident in adaptation failure theory may be observed in military failures as well. This
leads to the final analysis, which tends to suggest that it is anything but final and
therefore may be indicative of a superordinate realm: strategic failure.
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Preface
Significance
Why had the United States, in recent history exhibited a slow response to
environmental changes within the realm of national security? Since the end of the Cold
War the U.S. appears to have been sluggish in adapting to the absence of the Soviet
Union and the emergence of new threats. Namely, the Intelligence Community and the
military have been unable to modify their perception of threats facing the U.S. in a timely
fashion. This is not to say that there has been no significant change, but simply too little1
(and perhaps a bit late) to meet the evolution of the global security milieu. This paper
deals with adaptation failure as a theory that has recently been developed with regard to
the Intelligence Community (IC). If the theory is robust it may resonate in other quarters.
Therefore, we shall attempt to view the decision process and its effect on the application
of force in Iraq (and Afghanistan to some extent) through the same prism2.
This paper considers the following two questions: Did the process of changing the
strategy in Iraq reflect the same failure to adapt to an unconventional war as that which
had plagued the Intelligence Community with regard to global terrorism? Secondly, is
there a larger adaptation failure at play, namely strategic failure? These questions are
important because if there is a parallel set of antecedents leading to distortion in both
categories then there is reason to believe that they may be subordinate to a broader issue.
1

As will be discussed throughout this paper, there have been numerous commissions regarding
“intelligence reform”. Though many of the same problems have been identified (e.g. a lack of: foreign
language speakers, culturally aware analysts, and a sense of “corporateness” to name a few), they have
persisted.
2
While speaking of the “military” the author realizes that military decisions are inherently controlled by
civilian leadership when addressing matters of Grand Strategy. Therefore, the term “military” represents
not only the uniformed services, but their civilian masters as well.
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If so, then perhaps it is destined to be repeated; not just within the halls of Langley and
Arlington3, but possibly having implications beyond.
Methods
The approach here is threefold, in that, a brief review of intelligence failures and
military failures should serve to highlight the problem. Proceeding forward, this paper
will look deeper into the points of friction between policymakers and their subordinate
intelligence and military communities. Then, as these interactions are highlighted, the
processes that tend to show causative relationships will be analyzed forensically. It is
hoped that by this method we can juxtapose the subsequent findings with the broad
category of strategic failure. In this effort, the objective is to determine whether further
research is warranted to test the hypothesis in the realm of Grand Strategy.
Sources
In order to approach the subject matter involved in this thesis it would be folly to
limit research to the twin inventories of intelligence and military literature. To truly
understand strategic decisions and how they affect policy (and the resultant effects that
tend to follow) it is necessary to go beyond the comfort of a singular thread of academic
discourse. It requires the consultation of seemingly boundless spheres of study; if only
for the sake of the global impact that American strategic decisions may generate. It is
therefore most appropriate that this paper has been spawned through research in a variety
of areas including, but not limited to Organizational Learning, Organizational
Psychology, Social Psychology, Political Psychology, Military History, Anthropology,

3

This is a reference to the cities in Virginia that are home to CIA and the Pentagon, respectively.
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Middle East (Near East) History, Surprise Attacks, Intelligence Failures, Insurgencies
and Counterinsurgencies4.
Declaration of personal biases
It would not be fair if your author did not declare the following biases. (1) This
paper is American-centric, as the terrorist acts forming the casus belli had targeted
American interests, property, and lives. In coming to terms with a very potent
transnational terrorist threat environment, and the outcome of American decisions, the
author has become directly involved in both the intelligence and military organizations
that have necessarily responded.
(2) Though various international relations theories provide insight here, there is an
ever-present (yet hopefully nearly imperceptible) neorealist5 hue that may tend to color
the author’s articulation. It is tempered, however, by alternative perspectives. In the
4

As this paper deals with adaptation- the precursor for which is learning- the fields of organizational
learning and organizational psychology have been useful in understanding the full spectrum within which
decisions pertaining to a shift in organizational direction are made. Having a smattering of social and
political psychology informs the reader/researcher of the individual and group processes by which
decisions are taken, as well as explaining some of the impediments to that end. An understanding of
military history, as it relates to the latter half of this paper, allows for the similarities/differences between
military campaigns to be properly recognized in a more concise form. This perspective tends to place in
context, interactions within and between the multitude of agencies, and to gauge the efficacy of policy
pursuits to achieve military “victory”. Middle East history describes the conditions under which the post9/11 threat environment had emerged. As for intelligence failures, they are often found to be largely
inextricably linked, as a forceful independent variable in surprise attack literature. Admittedly, this link
does not fully explain what effect policy choices have had in forming the exploitable vulnerabilities that
render a state susceptible to disaster. The success of insurgencies and counterinsurgencies tend to be
explained through the prisms of anthropology and sociology. Invariably the latter two regions of study are
human-centric approaches to the broader phenomena of the former two.
5
The neorealist school of thought that the author subscribes to is admittedly most applicable under normal,
conventional conditions. That is, the structural relationships between nation-states in an anarchic world
(lacking a central sovereign) tend to produce certain interactive dynamics geared toward self-preservation.
Theory of International Politics, Kenneth N. Waltz, ( Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., (1979).
While this Westphalian states system is assumed to be the “norm”, and power-balancing an outcome, the
author recognizes that neorealist thought has been challenged and has spawned theories of “Complex
Interdependence”, as developed and advanced by, among others, Keohane and Nye. See: Power and
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, (Boston: Little,
Brown and Company, 1977).
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interest of space and scope this paper will not entertain, on theoretical grounds, the merits
of international relations theory since the primary focus is centered on transnational
terrorism and unconventional warfare.
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Introduction and Thesis Statement
For some time now, studies have been indicating that the events of 9/11/01 were
not detected and defeated in advance as a consequence of intelligence failure(s). While
this is a very broad category and much has been written on it, there is a particular strand
of literature that this paper seeks to explore and perhaps even apply to another category
of perceived failure: strategic failure as it relates to the application of military force.
Recently, a very robust case has been made by Amy Zegart regarding a “failure to adapt”
by the Intelligence Community6.
Following the surprise attack on 11 September 20017, the U.S. has been engaged
in wars in Iraq, Afghanistan, and globally in its campaign against “terror.”8 Following
initial conventional military victories in both Iraq and Afghanistan, symptoms have
appeared that are consistent with Zegart’s “adaptation failure” hypothesis. Namely, the
requisite shift from conventional military operations to Irregular Warfare geared toward
the insurgencies that followed the American military intervention in the heart of the

6

The sum, substance and citation for Zegart’s work will follow in the second chapter.
The attacks of 11 September were at the operational level a manipulation of American security
shortcomings, while the tactical level consisted of suicide attacks that used airplanes as precision guided
munitions. Suicide attacks are not a new phenomenon. Additionally, as Pape points out, the logic of
suicide as an implement of war is not limited to the adherents of Islam and has a history dating back to 66
CE: “The best known suicide operations before 1980 also had coercive aims. The Zealots, the Assassins,
and the kamikazes all sought to coerce their political opponents, either to remove foreign military forces
from their homeland or to prevent imminent military invasions.” See Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of
Suicide Terrorism, Robert A. Pape (New York: Random House, 2005), quote from p. 33.
8
It is a bit odd to declare that war is being waged against an emotional adjective. Even less clear, if
“terror” is a verb, then it appears to lose meaning when employing military action against such an abstract
concept. What makes matters even more nebulous is that engaging in a course of armed combat with
“terrorists” presupposes that all enemies are engaged in “terrorism.” Some members of the adversary
groups may see themselves as resisting invasion and domination. If their target set consists of a foreign
army that is not indigenous to the area, then perhaps the “terrorism” label has few legs on which to stand.
However, when the target set consists of civilians there is no disputing the patent facts. The unintended
effect of using such a label in such a broad manner cheapens its currency. A similar case would be labeling
all autocracies as “evil” and equating them with Adolf Hitler. Such language should be reserved to
describe a very limited number of regimes and characters.
7
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Middle East. Specifically, counterinsurgency (COIN) has not been applied early enough
to avoid the bloodletting.
This paper compares some of the causal lines drawn by Zegart and explores
whether they are applicable to the recent war in Iraq9. Specifically, the thesis is: If the
U.S. Intelligence Community failed to adapt to a changed post-Cold War threat
environment and this failure was paralleled by comparable missteps in the military
realm, there appears to be ample evidence to signal that the bases of their malfunction
potentially reside in another category of failure: strategic failure.

9

Though Afghanistan may be just as appropriate to study, this paper is mostly limiting the majority of its
scope to Iraq.
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Chapter 1: Adaptation Failure in the Intelligence Community
… Some observers believe that intelligence agencies may be in for a period of transition
and adaptation exceeding the one that followed immediately upon the dissolution of the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact.

-Richard A. Best Jr.10
The New World Order Revisited
While the primary American enemy has ceased to be the Soviet Union, U.S.
foreign policy response had been ill-defined in the decade that followed. As the stability
of the structurally bipolar world had disintegrated the United States found itself atop a
unipolar11 global landscape. The balance of power reconfiguration had caused stagnation
in terms of strategic vision and the role of the U.S. in world affairs12. The U.S. had a full
decade to adjust its focus, yet seemed not to have been able to achieve a healthy sense of
clarity. It was as though intellectual inertia and ambiguous prioritization had displaced

10

Issue Brief for Congress: “Intelligence Issues for Congress”, Richard A. Best, Jr. (Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division, Congressional Research Service); updated 1 October, 2002, IB10012; p.
CRS-2.
11
The term “unipolar” here describes the global power structure. For instance, “bipolarity” had been used
as a shorthand term to illustrate the balance of power between the Soviet Bloc and Western powers during
the Cold War. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, “bipolarity” was no longer. Though some may
argue that “multipolarity” defines what had remained, the United States and her allies held at least some
primacy in the period that followed. This does not negate the possibility that rising global competitors may
seek regional dominance, hence “multipolarity” would probably be a more appropriate descriptor (though
admittedly it is a bit odd to declare more than two poles to be in existence).
12
This period of time could perhaps be defined as transitional. The policy arguments of the 1990s seemed
to be geared toward returning to isolationism, or some form of retrenchment. The threat environment was
being looked at through a host of concerns from environmental and population factors to Weapons of Mass
Destruction (WMD) as a threat short of total annihilation. For a more full treatment of these arguments see
At Issue: Politics in the World Arena, Steven L. Spiegel and David J. Pervin eds, (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1994, 7th Edition) and The Future of American Foreign Policy, Eugene R. Wittkopf and Christopher
M. Jones eds., (New York: St. Martin’s/Worth Publishers, 1999). It seems that there was awareness of the
changing global social and political landscape, but the threat environment was not named to reflect
something akin to “The Cold War.” The term, “interregnum” was used to describe the period, but it was
not conceptually helpful. See Foreign Policy, Summer 2000, itself entitled, “What Comes after the ‘PostCold War’”; pp. 44-46 addresses the interregnum (Christoph Bertram).
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its ancestral lucidity, during the Cold War. The Grand Strategy13 of that time was simple:
containment14.
As the moribund Grand Strategy15 of the prior half-century had not yielded a new
approach, spillover effects appear to have trickled down to its subordinate national
security apparatus16. Hence, the IC had been unable to meet the demands of the rising
specter of global jihadist terrorism. In a similar vein, the military and civilian
policymakers have had a hard time maintaining an adaptive capacity with regard to war
fighting in Southwest Asia.
Though the 2003 Iraq War had initially been similar to the conventional firepower
and maneuver warfare of the past century, it soon morphed into something seemingly

13

B.H. Liddell Hart defines strategy as, “the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the
ends of policy”, whereas Grand Strategy is “… practically synonymous with the policy that guides the
conduct of war…” in Strategy, B.H. Liddell Hart (New York: Meridian, second revised ed. 1991); quotes
found on pp. 321-322. Liddell Hart holds that Grand Strategy is superordinate to strategy, though both
ultimately serve policy.
14
Jeremi Suri claims the absence of a coherent conceptual model during the 1990s was applicable to both
the administrations of George H.W. Bush and William J. Clinton. Suri describes that time period as being
akin to an “anti-strategy.” He asserts that what makes the formulation of a Grand Strategy rather difficult
to come by is the pluralistic structure of American society. “Grand Strategy requires consensus which is
very difficult to build and sustain amidst the competition of interests and ideas that define American
democracy.” “American Grand Strategy from the Cold War’s End to 9/11”, Orbis, Fall, 2009, pp. 611-627;
the quote was drawn from p. 626. Therese Delpech essentially equates the 1990s with the period between
WWI and WWII in “The Imbalance of Terror”, The Washington Quarterly, 25: 1 (Winter 2002) pp. 31-40.
One might say that the fog of interwar is what impedes policy imagination.
15
According to Henry Kissinger, “… the deepest reason for America’s difficulty in the 1990s with
developing a coherent strategy for a world in which its role is so central was that three different generations
with very different approaches to foreign policy were disputing America’s role.” He indicates these three
generations to be of the 1950s/60s Cold War, the Vietnam protest movement that followed and the
generation that followed both and was unable to appreciate their predecessors’ paradigm. Does America
Need a Foreign Policy?: Toward a Diplomacy for the 21st Century, (New York: Simon and Schuster,
2001); p. 28.
16
The Intelligence Community is a broad term conferring a sense of unified agenda and outlook upon 15
member organizations. The Department of Defense is a large constituent element of national security,
which contains all of the service branches’ intelligence units (and DIA- Defense Intelligence Agency). In a
democracy, all members of the IC are necessarily subordinate to policymakers’ priorities as informed by
their comprehension of international affairs. This can be skewed by biases on either side of the divide (a
major theme of this paper).
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foreign: irregular warfare in the form of insurgency17. Both the IC in the period 19912001 and the military in the period 2001- 2006 were woefully unprepared to meet the
threats that the U.S. had faced. The reasons why, it is hoped, will be adequately
addressed regularly throughout this paper.
Terrorism as a tool had taken on new meaning in 2001. The weaknesses of
Western intelligence were effectively exploited on 11 September. What was different in
this new environment were the limitless objectives of the terrorists, their use of American
openness, an inability to be deterred (as suicide-homicide had been the chosen method of
attack), and the knowledge that the American IC was bound by legal constraints that
prohibited the requisite penetration of the HUMINT (Human Intelligence) target: dirty
assets.18
Defining Adaptation Failure
The main theme of this work is centered on adaptation. Therefore, it is worth
defining in precise terms. Adaptation is distinguished from change in a very specific
way. To simply change is a more basic action, similar to a modification in appearance.
17

Insurgency is not a new concept. As will be discussed later, the Vietnam War had been fought largely by
America’s adversary as an insurgency, whose aim (by definition) was to upset the legitimacy of the ruling
government in the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam). The American experience in that war left a bad
taste in mouths of the would-be military leaders in the decades to come. Also, the U.S. had often played
the supporting role for a variety of insurgencies during the Cold War, a subject beyond the scope of this
paper.
18
There are costs associated with such a moral soiling. This point is noted by Gregory F. Treverton in
“Covert Action and Open Society”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 65, No. 5 (Summer, 1987), 995-1014.
It has been argued that the political consequences of dealing with persons such as those who perpetrate acts
of terror against a civilian populace are too costly to bear. This case was made in part in J. Cilluffo, Ronald
A. Marks, and George C. Salmoiraghi, “The Use and Limits of U.S. Intelligence”, The Washington
Quarterly, (Winter, 2002), 61-74. One useful depiction of the changed threat environment is made on p.
65: “Part of the changing face of international terrorism, referring to al Qaeda in particular, involves the
terrorists’ ultimate objectives. These networks no longer seek a seat at the negotiating table; instead, they
want to blow up the table and build a new one in its place.”
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To adapt is to alter one’s approach to better match the environmental challenges it faces.
It involves more depth and breadth. An example that illustrates the difference between
the two follows: When a police department decides to switch to a new uniform it is a
mere change. When the department decides that a new approach to crime-fighting is
necessary to suit the level and nature of crime in the community, it has adapted19.
As a theory, “adaptation failure” has been generated and pursued by Amy B.
Zegart, and shapes the central argument of this paper. Though Zegart has studied
adaptation failure with respect to the IC, it is a useful discussion to have as the second
half of this paper asserts that the difficulty experienced by the IC in adapting to the postCold War threat environment may not only apply to the military, but to other elements of
national import as well20.
Zegart has had an opportunity to analyze failed intelligence reforms prior to
9/1121. She views efforts to reform as having suffered from a failure to adapt.
Adaptation, Zegart asserts is a more appropriate term than change. Adaptation connotes
something entirely distinct from change. When an organization experiences change it is a
partial measure. A more robust change may be measured by its magnitude, which may
19

E.g. proactive policing (actively seeking criminal behavior, such as establishing a counter-narcotics unit),
is an adaptive approach, whereas reactive policing (responding to a complaint and relying on luck and
circumstance to detect illicit narcotic activity) may be the standard protocol.
20
F.G. Hoffman has implied that there is reason to believe that such an adaptation failure applies to the
military, “The Anatomy of the Long War’s Failings”, Footnotes, Foreign Policy Research Institute, May
2009, Vol. 14, No. 16. This assessment is drawn heavily from Military Misfortunes: The Anatomy of
Failure in War, Eliot Cohen and John Gooch (New York: Free Press, 1990). The term “adaptation” is
defined here as “the ability ‘to handle the changing present’ and the interactive nature of war.” The 2006
edition of this book in paperback addresses the American military experience in Iraq, though briefly; pp.
247-251. Cohen and Gooch claim that American failure in Iraq is owed to a failure to anticipate, but more
so to a failure to learn. This paper asserts that these categories of failure are merely subordinate children to
their parent cause: adaptation failure (which they include as a conceptual equal to the other two).
Moreover, as the subtitle indicates, this book is a study of failure in war, not in the preceding decision
phases leading to war. Nonetheless, their case studies are quite thorough.
21
Amy B. Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms Before September 11”, Political
Science Quarterly, Vol. 121, No. 1 (2006), 33-60.
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be seen as a transformation. Yet adaptation indicates a recognition that an “improved fit”
must develop between an organization and its external environment22. Zegart asserts that
awareness of a changing environment prior to 9/11 had been prevalent within the IC and
Congress, and numerous recommendations to better meet the new threats had not
produced the requisite adaptation.
The adaptation referred to here is that of an apparent organizational nature.
During the post-Cold War period of the 1990s the IC did begin to focus more on
combating terrorism23. Apparently intelligence officials and policymakers were
cognizant of a need for organizational change in response to such emerging threats.
Between the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and 11 September 2001, no fewer than
twelve major bipartisan commissions, governmental studies, and think tank task forces
examined the U.S. intelligence community and U.S. counterterrorism efforts. All of their
reports urged reform within intelligence agencies, across the intelligence community, and
24
between the intelligence community and other parts of the U.S. government.

Awareness is a necessary, but insufficient precursor for adaptation. Zegart asserts
that a failure to adapt was ever-present during the period 1991-2001. She has observed
340 recommendations for change from the above-mentioned twelve studies of the IC. Of
those, Zegart notes that ten percent were fully implemented25. Even where commissions
had convened to study the role of law enforcement in counterterrorism, a large part of
their recommendations focused on the IC.

22

Ibid.; pp.35-36.
Ibid.; p. 40.
24
Ibid.; pp. 45-46; see Table 2 on p. 46 as it tallies the above-referenced studies. (Also see Spying Blind:
The CIA, the FBI, and the Origins of 9/11, Amy B. Zegart [Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University
Press, 2007]; pp. 32-33).
25
Ibid.; p. 52.
23
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Four common findings were observed during this period26. First, from an
organizational leadership perspective the IC was structurally misaligned. The DCI
(Director of Central Intelligence) was both the head of the IC itself and head of the CIA.
Given that the Secretary of Defense had 85% of the intelligence budget, the DCI was
really placed in a position of impotence with regard to resources and funding. As he
delivered the CIA-prepared PDB (President’s Daily Brief – which is now a communitywide product) he was still the CIA’s director. This makes the task of remaining unbiased
toward any particular member unit of the IC difficult. Second, prioritization for collection
and analysis was not only ineffective, it was observed to be lacking order and
standardization.
Third, among the many intelligence disciplines, HUMINT was sorely wanting for
reasons related to legislation banning contact with human rights violators; which is
precisely the class of individuals whom HUMINT collectors must co-opt, subvert, or
otherwise coax for information.27 The fourth theme centers on personnel. In one sense a
deficiency in this category represents a more detrimental failure to adapt than the other
categories do. The reason is because in the post-Cold War world the rising threat was
foreign terrorism. This required a necessary response by the IC to attract and incentivize
the educational enhancement of people who have the appropriate language proficiency
and cultural appreciation to know one’s enemy (a central tenet in both war-fighting and
intelligence tradition- usually attributed to Sun Tzu and Carl Von Clausewitz). Lacking

26

Ibid.; pp. 53-55. Note that these four themes are reviewed here in a cursory fashion. It is in the interest
of avoiding redundancy that these matters are not explored more heavily at this point. However, if one
reads this paper carefully it should become apparent that such themes are dealt with more insightfully at
other points.
27
See, “We Have Not Correctly Framed the Debate on Intelligence Reform”, Saxby Chambliss,
Parameters, Spring 2005, pp. 5-13.
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the will to fire poor performers also served as a hindrance. Intelligence information
sharing was also deeply deficient. The IC could have done a better job of ensuring crossagency temporary rotations and encouraging an environment of information sharing.
Causal Logic
Zegart maintains that the key causal factor in adaptation failure was politics.
Three seemingly simple, but insurmountable “enduring realities” appeared to be at play28.
The “nature of bureaucratic organizations”, the “rational self-interest of political actors”,
and the interests of national security bureaucrats with all of their attendant protectionist
proclivities to guarantee they are secure29.
If Zegart is right about an adaptation failure- and it is this author’s position that
she is, then perhaps there is an application that can be made to other areas of decisionmaking. Understanding what an adaptation failure looks like is important. More
important, however, is to understand what its component parts consist of. This will
enable one to view with clarity the phenomenon as it unfolds. If such clarity could be
had, then it may be possible to identify the antecedents of adaptation failure in order to
mitigate its pernicious effects. Should this be the case it would potentially have infinite
application across many fields of government concern.
The reason that recognizing adaptation failure in its incipient phase is critical can
be seen in every area of private and public life. In the former, if a firm manufactures an
outmoded product because it is unable to adapt to a changing market it will go out of

28

Zegart, “An Empirical Analysis of Failed Intelligence Reforms…”, p. 59.
Ibid. 59; note that the third point is paraphrased, whereas the first and second were drawn as a direct
quote.

29
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business. It is nice to produce a horse-drawn carriage, but since consumers are
demanding cars, buses, trains, and planes it is ineffectual.
Studying Intelligence Failures:
A large body of work regarding intelligence failures has centered on surprise
attacks.30 As Richard K. Betts argues, it is quite ordinary for an IC to experience failure,
as it has been suggested that failure is inevitable, natural, and to be expected31. In many
ways this idea had become a matter of accepted wisdom in the IC:
In the best-known cases of intelligence failure, the most crucial mistakes have seldom
been made by collectors of raw information, occasionally by professionals who produce
finished analyses, but most often by the decision makers who consume the products of
intelligence services. Policy premises constrict perception, and administrative workloads
constrain reflection. Intelligence failure is political and psychological more often than
32
organizational.

Insofar as the individual analysts’ cognitive barriers exist- and there are many
such barriers- they are not the biggest cause of intelligence failure. Indeed, it is the
knowledge that intelligence consumers (policymakers) have themselves a number of
cognitive barriers and biases that appear to have the greater impact on the intelligence
failures. The consumption end of the spectrum is composed of… “political men who

30

Richard A. Posner presents a useful analysis of “surprise attacks” in his book, Preventing Surprise
Attacks: Intelligence Reform in the Wake of 9/11, Richard A. Posner, (Lanham, MD: Rowman and
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005). Special attention should be paid to Chapter 3 entitled, “The history and
Anatomy of Successful Surprise Attacks” (pp. 73-97).
31
Richard K. Betts, “Analysis, War, and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures are Inevitable”, World
Politics, Vol. 31, No. 1 (Oct., 1978), 61-89. “Intelligence failures are not only inevitable, they are natural”;
p. 88.
32
Ibid.; p.61.
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have risen by being more decisive than reflective, more aggressive than introspective and
confident as much as cautious.”33
Betts suggests that awareness of this phenomenon by analysts and producers may
serve to diminish such misperceptions34. Still, the attacking party has certain advantages
of which it is difficult, if not impossible, to disarm them35. That is, the victim may be
lulled into a false sense of security by the attacker, built upon the victim’s own
proclivities toward inaction. Additionally, no one can afford to continuously warn of an
impending attack, lest they be labeled as one who “cries wolf”, causing “alert fatigue”
and resulting in a loss of credibility. A “self-negating prophecy” may also be produced36.
What’s more, as Betts indicates elsewhere, “deception is cheap. Little investment in men
and material is necessary, and the return is very high.”37
Warning as the Less Significant Source of Failure than Decision:
Decision makers are part of the intelligence process; intelligence failures implicate them
as well. For example, decision makers often say they want warnings when they actually
do not. Warnings usually imply a need to reorder priorities, including the allocation of
resources.

-Jennifer E. Sims38

33

Ibid.; p. 83.
Ibid.; p.84.
35
Richard K. Betts, “Surprise, Scholasticism, and Strategy: A Review of Ariel Levite’s Intelligence and
Strategic Surprises (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987)”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol.
33, No. 3 (Sep., 1989), 329-343.
36
Ibid.; p. 339. The concept of a “self-negating prophecy” is explained elsewhere in Micromotives and
Macrobehavior, Thomas C. Schelling, (New York and London, 1978); pp. 115-119. Schelling discusses a
number of “prophecies.” They all have the commonality of origin: expectations.
37
“Surprise Despite Warning: Why Sudden Attacks Succeed”, Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95, No. 4
(Winter, 1980-1981), 551-572; p. 564.
38
“Understanding Friends and Enemies: The Context for American Intelligence Reform”, Jennifer E. Sims,
in Transforming U.S. Intelligence, Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, Eds., (Washington, D.C.:
Georgetown University Press, 2005); Chapter 2, p. 16.
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The function of intelligence is primarily that of warning. Warning focuses on two
categories: capabilities and intentions39. The former is a Western strength (similar to
“bean counting”40), whereas the latter is more difficult to know, given that select few in
the adversary’s chain of command may be privy to such information.
Western warning intelligence will be excellent though imperfect, persuasive but not
irresistible. The proficiency of intelligence can also be a mixed blessing. Monitoring
capability that is properly recognized to be excellent encourages reliance on warning, but
since the principal of surprise is decision rather than warning, this dulls sensitivity to the
41
possibility of sudden attack.

Still, the problem of timely warning is not as influential as human psychology and
politics are42. “Hedging against surprise is hard because the causes are deeply embedded
in human psychology, political uncertainty, military complexity, and organizational
viscosity.”43
The Essence of Warning:
The fact of surprise at Pearl Harbor has never been persuasively explained by accusing
the participants, individually or in groups, of conspiracy or negligence or stupidity. What
these examples illustrate is rather the very human tendency to pay attention to the signals
that support current expectations about enemy behavior. If no one is listening for signals
of an attack against a highly improbable target, then it is very difficult for the signals to
be heard.

-Roberta Wohlstetter44
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Anticipating Surprise: Analysis for Strategic Warning, Cynthia M. Grabo, (Lanham, MD: University of
America, Inc.: 2004); pp. 4-18. At the tactical level, warning is more concerned with capabilities.
However, at the strategic level, it should be more concerned with intentions. “Strategic warning” is still illdefined.
40
Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 3rd Ed. Mark M. Lowenthal, (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006);
p. 223.
41
Surprise Attack: Lessons for Defense Planning, Richard K. Betts, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings
Institution, 1982); p. 198.
42
Ibid.; p. 286.
43
Ibid.; p. 309.
44
Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision, Roberta Wohlstetter (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962);
p. 392.
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The “signal-to-noise” ratio may cause distortion in perception. That is, the
ability to collect is not necessarily the problem of warning as much as the ability to
discern what a clear indication of enemy intentions may be. There is a wealth of
literature explaining the perception barriers to effective intelligence, which oftentimes
leads to disastrous outcomes.
The attack on Pearl Harbor is not in any way an anomaly. Numerous
conventional surprise attacks before and after Pearl Harbor seem to have suffered from
very similar symptoms in that the signals were buried amongst the cacophony of noise.
However, the thorough case study of that conventional surprise attack has provided much
of the foundation for the examination of unconventional surprise attacks that have
followed45.
“Apparently human beings have a stubborn attachment to old beliefs and an
equally stubborn resistance to new material that will upset them.”46 This problematic
truth has not been diluted much since the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941. If anything, it
is often made worse by the increasing ability to collect vast amounts of data that are
unable to be processed by analysts (producers) in a timely fashion and digested by
decision makers (consumers) who have their own paradigmatic predispositions regarding
the global milieu and the source and nature of threats that abound.
45

Some examples of conventional surprise attacks that have been analyzed in detail were the 1941 Nazi
advance into The Soviet Union (Operation Barbarossa), the 1968 North Vietnamese Tet Offensive, the
1973 Egyptian crossing of the Suez in the Mid-East October War (also called the Yom Kippur War, or the
Ramadan War) to name a few. This paper is more inclined to look at the so-called “unconventional”
surprise attacks, such as that which had occurred on 9/11/01; Al-Qa’ida vs. the U.S. There have been
many cases of successful conventional surprise attack in the past century. Though an initial advantage was
tactically successful, what stands out about the history of surprise attacks teaches us that the short term
gains are usually followed by a long term strategic loss. Still, the initial shock value is enough to cause the
public to inquire as to the causal origins. The public record indicates that it is gauged as an intelligence
failure and through this prism an inquiry is undertaken. We shall address this matter in the coming pages.
46
Wohlstetter, “Pearl Harbor”; p. 393.
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It has been further argued that perhaps equal parts blame are to be found in both
the analysis and decision sides of the equation. In a study of the Beirut bombings of the
U.S. Marine Barracks and State Department, Erik J. Dahl has argued that lack of
“focused imagination” had been significant despite adequate intelligence47. Dahl argues
that analysts and consumers were not imaginative enough to have recognized a shift in
tactics that would have revealed the changed threat environment. Subsequently, in the
link between producers and consumers the emerging unconventional threat was not
adequately communicated:
Most of the classical problems associated with warning and surprise were, however,
evident: cognitive limitations prevented analysts and decision-makers from even
imagining what they were facing, while modern intelligence and communications
technology produced a numbing overabundance of information. The verdict of history
has largely cleared the intelligence community of significant blame in this case,
supporting the orthodox view that warning of terrorist attack is extraordinarily difficult
and failure can only be expected. But this is wrong, for our case study indicates the
intelligence community must share an equal portion of the responsibility, both for passing
on a flood of intelligence data without conducting the necessary analysis, and - just as
important – for not ensuring that the intelligence was being received and understood
properly by commanders.48

The “Fault” Lines
The “ambiguous language of intelligence”49 is an outgrowth of the somewhat
speculative nature of intelligence analysis50, which in turn hinders the degree of certainty
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Erik J. Dahl, “Warning of Terror: Explaining the Failure of Intelligence Against Terrorism”, The Journal
of Strategic Studies, Vol. 28, No. 1, 31-55, February 2005.
48
Ibid.; p. 49.
49
Surprise Attack: The Victim’s Perspective, Ephraim Kam, (Cambridge, MA/London, England: Harvard
University Press, 1988, reprinted in paperback 2004); p. 24.
50
One delineation to make with regard to analysis is related to its subdivision into two categories:
Substantiated analysis and speculative analysis. The former indicates “exact, verified, and up-to-date data”,
as the latter is “based on a generally good acquaintance with the other side’s way of thinking and past
behavior”; Shlomo Gazit, “Estimates and Fortune-Telling in Intelligence Work”, International Security,
Vol. 4, No. 4 (Spring, 1982) 36-56; quote from p. 44. This may present a source of some difficulty for the
consumer, who is attempting to discern truth. The analyst may choose to indicate whether they are
informed by scientific knowledge (substantiated) or reasonable wisdom-based knowledge (speculative).
The article highlights many of the complexities within the relationship between producers and consumers.
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that the consumer may place in the assessments they make based on intelligence
products51. In the interplay between decision makers and intelligence producers,
Ephraim Kam suggests that there are three injurious effects that tend to obstruct the
intelligence process:
1-“…analysts are not always sensitive to the needs of decision makers and do not
properly direct their production toward issues that are important to policy.”
2- “…intelligence analysts find it difficult to assess and predict the enemy’s intentions
and willingness to take risks since these depend to a large extent on their own
government’s future moves.”
3- “… intelligence analysts are sometimes unaware of the costs and benefits of their own
assessment, especially when the issue is as critical as predicting a coming war.”52

Moreover, the burden placed on decision makers is very acute, and has farreaching consequences. It is they who must choose wisely from among the multitude of
possibilities in order to formulate the appropriate policies and countermeasures53. This
challenge further strengthens as the decision makers have little time to devote to finished
intelligence products54.

51

Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, p. 28. There is much evidence of the friction between intelligence
producers and consumers. Shulsky and Shmitt have observed that this can be due to several factors.
Namely, that policymakers become upset when intelligence fails to be fully supportive of policy, the
dependent (as opposed to independent) relationship that the IC has with policymakers, and the perceived
level of expertise that may or may not exist at either end of the spectrum. Therefore, they argue that the
only way to insulate the IC from policymakers is to have service chiefs with the “…willingness and ability
to protect analysts from outside pressure.” Silent Warfare: Understanding the World of Intelligence,
Abram N. Shulsky and Gary J. Schmitt, 3rd ed., (Dulles, VA: Potomac Books, 2002); pp. 133-141.
52
Ephraim Kam, Surprise Attack, pp. 207-208. Though these three effects describe a conventional
environment it is worth considering that such differences exist between the two realms. This illustrates the
required division of labor and their unintended impact. These are by no means the only impediments to
effective intelligence analysis. Others, such as those related to conceptual rigidity, are explored a bit later
in this paper ; pp. 85-114.
53
Ibid.; pp. 211-212.
54
This is a recurring theme in the study of intelligence failures, as Roger Hilsman had studied in the early
days of the IC’s codified existence. See Roger Hilsman, Jr., “Intelligence and Policy-Making in Foreign
Affairs”, World Politics, Vol. 5, No. 1 (Oct., 1952), 1-45. This point is made on pp. 11-13, and 37.
Hilsman also treats producers’ and consumers’ lack of introspection with the prescription that both ends
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There are inherent impediments within the “intelligence cycle”55 that pertain to
every step in the process. As this paper is naturally unable to address them all, there is an
area in which to focus: the nexus between the policy-minded consumers and the
managing body of the producers56. Whereas “politicization” is normally considered to be
a pejorative term, Richard Betts relaxes the definition to incorporate a sense of
normalcy57. It is the concept, that since policy drives intelligence and in turn, intelligence
informs policymakers, there are naturally going to be political players on the
consumption side of the equation.
It is important to note that politicization is not equivalent to corruption. That
would be the extreme form of politics meddling in intelligence affairs. Rather, it is the
appreciation of its presence that analysts, particularly managers, must bear in mind when
editing intelligence products. As politicization can’t be eliminated, awareness of its
existence may provide the managers in the IC to be in a position to reduce its harmful
must not only consider the source of their own biases, but that “At the same time the researchers must
become policy-oriented.” p. 43. Again, this is a recurring theme: Enemies of Intelligence: Knowledge and
Power in American National Security, Richard K. Betts, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007); p.
40.
55
Traditionally, the “intelligence cycle” starts with Planning and Direction, based on policymakers’ needs.
It then flows to Collection, Processing and Exploitation, then Analysis and Production, Dissemination, and
presumably back to Planning and Direction. While the “cycle” refers to a seemingly cyclical pattern, it is
somewhat incomplete. There are times in which feedback and policy needs dictate that the cycle revert
back to an earlier stage, for instance Analysis and Production. It may therefore be better to illustrate the
“cycle” in a more linear fashion. See Lowenthal, Intelligence; (Third edition, 2006), pp. 65-67.
56
Following the surprise nuclear tests by India in 1998, Melvin Goodman wrote, “The Indian fiasco has
exposed the three major deficiencies evident at the CIA for the past several years: politicization,
bureaucratization, and a fundamental misunderstanding of the proper interaction between intelligence and
policymaking.” “US intelligence failure shows need for reform”, Christian Science Monitor, 08827729, 18
May, 1998, Vol. 90, Issue 120.
57
Betts, Enemies of Intelligence; pp. 76-79. One aspect of politicization is of interest here, and that is the
explicitly stated object of inquiry was to determine if politicization was at play in the Iraq WMD
investigation. The inquiry began in 2003 with pronouncements that policymakers not only misused
intelligence, but that they had manipulated it to improve its suitability with policy preferences. The fact
that this allegation was made by Democratic opponents against the Republican administration implies that
there is some preliminary political shading that fuels such an inquiry. On the other side of the coin, the
Republican administration used Executive Privilege to circumvent such charges. See “Robust Intelligence
Oversight Stalls at White House Door”, Helen Fessenden, CQ Weekly; 26 July 2003, Vol. 61 Issue 30, p.
1917, 5p, 2bw.
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effects58. So too may their subordinates and superiors, as well as the consuming
policymakers.
The criticism of DCIs past has been either that they are too close to the president
and/or his most influential policymaking circle, or that the president shuns them. Betts
has suggested that the solution is probably not realistic, but nonetheless it is a solution of
sorts:
There is a solution to this dilemma in theory, although not in legislation: select a
president and an intelligence director with particular personality traits. The best chief of
intelligence is one who has the personal confidence and trust of the president, but who
delights in telling the inner circle what it does not want to hear. This relationship can be
sustained, of course, only if the president likes to have his thinking challenged and his job
59
complicated- something more common among intellectuals than among politicians.

Impediments
Cognitive Impediments
As mentioned above, delving into the intricacies of the “intelligence cycle” is not
a priority here. However, many of the problems within the cycle seem to indicate that
they affect both producers and consumers. Since we are exploring the zone between the
two, it is important to discuss what some of the seemingly irreducible cognitive barriers
are, that may influence both. Richards J. Heuer Jr. has illuminated many of these within
the context of deception, a key element in any surprise attack60. Though Heuer had
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Ibid.; While managers may be mindful of politics, it is ultimately the DCI (Director of Central
Intelligence) and the DNI (Director of National Intelligence- a position that was recommended for decades,
but was not implemented until again it was recommended in the Terrorism and Prevention Act of 2004)
who have the president’s ear. It would not be incorrect to say that they are political actors to some degree
as well.
59
“The New Politics of Intelligence: Will Reforms Work This Time?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, No. 3
(May/June 2004) 2-8. This quote was drawn from pp. 7-8.
60
Richards J. Heuer, Jr. “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception: A Cognitive Process Approach”,
International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 2, Symposium in Honor of Hans J. Morgenthau (Jun., 1981),
294-327.
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focused on the destructive forces militating against analysts’ perceptions, it is certainly
applicable to the policymakers as well61.
The inelasticity of mental frameworks tends to withstand discrepant information,
which in turn is advantageous for the attacking party. It is far easier to deceive an
adversary if one is exploiting the victim’s presumptions, rather than luring them into a
different set of preconceptions62. The existence of such a rigid set of biases is an
outgrowth of the need to establish order in one’s thinking, so that the human need to
understand the world around them may yield the genesis of causality and perhaps a vision
of what is to come63.
A couple of interesting facts were discovered in a study of international crises, as
they relate to the policymakers’ role. “The most commonly observed symptom was
failure to reevaluate alternatives, which was found in 15 of the 19 cases” 64. This
cognitive rigidity sets the stage for disaster. In other words, even given adequate
intelligence that a crisis will unfold, policymakers may choose to cling to what is most
comfortable. Secondly, “individuals who display a capability for analytic decision
making do not always use it.”65
In another area of study regarding premature cognitive closure, Uri Bar-Joseph
and Arie W. Kruglanski have identified two types of needs associated with either
61

Perception and Misperception in International Politics, Robert Jervis, (Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1976). Jervis had made this point specifically in his tremendously rich study of decision-makers’
ignorance of the historical record, as having incorrectly learned from surprise attacks- among other jolts to
the system; owing in part to their cognitive recalcitrance. This is evident on pp. 218, 224-225, 237, and
307.
62
Heuer, “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception”; pp. 298, 304 and 317-318.
63
Ibid.; pp. 310, 314 and 322-323.
64
Gregory M. Herek; Irving L. Janis; Paul Huth, “Decision Making during International Crises: Is Quality
of Process Related to Outcome?”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 31, No. 2 (Jun., 1987), 203226); p. 214.
65
Ibid.; p. 215.
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personality, position, or both, that are observable66. First, is the “urgency principle”
(“seizing”); the imperative time constraints that demand quick closure. The second is the
“permanence principle” (“freezing”); the notion that once closure has been made,
inconsistent evidence will be deflected as insignificant, or it may be misinterpreted to
conform to the established intransigent schema67. What exacerbates these effects,
according to Bar-Joseph and Kruglanski, is the sense of prestige and influence that one
may have within the halls of power68. This may also trickle down, if even in subtle form,
from authoritative personalities to their subordinate members69. In the case of the Iraq
WMD “failure” (discussed shortly), it may have had a similar systemic impact. This
seems to be in consonance with Zegart’s assertions of causality for adaptation failure
(discussed earlier).
Systemic Impediments
One way to envision the distinction between policy and intelligence is to see them as two
spheres of government activity that are separated by a semipermeable membrane. The
membrane is semipermeable because policymakers can and do cross over into the
intelligence sphere, but intelligence officials cannot cross over into the policy sphere.

-Mark M. Lowenthal70

The above quote represents the unilateral boundary crossing that characterizes the
dynamics of subordination. One implication of this dynamic seems to be that in a
subordinate-superior relationship the former will be more likely reticent than the latter.
Historically, the relationship that the president and his staff have had with the DCI
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“Intelligence Failure and Need for Cognitive Closure: On the Psychology of the Yom Kippur Surprise”,
Uri Bar-Joseph and Arie W. Kruglanski, Political Psychology, Vol. 24, No. 1, 2003; pp. 75-99.
67
Ibid.; both points are found on p. 81.
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Ibid.; p. 82.
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Ibid.; p. 81. On p. 84 they illustrate this adverse impact very convincingly.
70
As cited above, Lowenthal, From Secrets to Policy (Third Ed.); p. 4, with a diagram on p. 5.
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explains much of the executive branch’s influence on “face time”, or lack thereof. It
seems to be a function of personal like/dislike between the two that impedes successful
national security policy formulation and implementation71. This may explain why some
intelligence is (mis)used and some is (dis)pleasing to policymakers.
There is another point worth bearing in mind, in that each of the national security
members of the intelligence cycle are bound by certain realities, stemming from the
anarchic structure of international relations. Therefore, clinging to the comfort of a
policy that has been proven useful in the past is a natural tendency that is hard to alter,
much less eliminate. The inherent condition of uncertainty in international relations often
inhibits policymakers’ imagination and restricts their menu of choice in order to cope
with it:
Most foreign policy is based on a high degree of continuity, inertia, and incremental
decision-making that is rarely questioned by those who participate in the implementation
process. Nevertheless, it is often claimed that ‘the uncertain nature of international
affairs creates a demand for flexibility as a safety valve.’ In reality, the shapers of
foreign policy seldom avail themselves of this safety valve. Instead of exploring new,
imaginative courses of action in order to cope with uncertainty, political leaders usually
72
cling to the ‘security’ of well-known policies.
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“Managing the Intelligence Community”, Stephen J. Flanagan, International Security, Vol. 10, No. 1
(Summer, 1985), 58-95; see pp. 67-68, 73, and 88 for a discussion of this topic. Also, for the below matter
concerning bureaucratic politics and rivalries, Flanagan discusses these themes throughout; particularly on
pp. 73, 75, 78-80, 82, 85-86, 88-89. Graham T. Allison has recalled how DCI John McCone was seen by
President Kennedy to have been hawkish in the lead-up to the Cuban Missile Crisis in “Conceptual Models
and the Cuban Missile Crisis”, The American Political Science Review, Vol. 63, No. 3 (Sep., 1969), p. 712:
“What the President least wanted to hear, the CIA was most hesitant to say plainly. On August 22 John
McCone met privately with the President and voiced suspicions that the Soviets were preparing to
introduce offensive missiles into Cuba. Kennedy heard this as what it was: the suspicion of a hawk.
McCone left Washington for a month’s honeymoon on the Riviera.” The distinction between “offensive”
and “defensive” weapons was created by the Kennedy Administration.
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Michael I. Handel, “Surprise and Change in International Politics”, International Security, Vol. 4, No. 4
(Spring, 1980), 57-85; p. 59, emphasis added. Though this was a study of “diplomatic surprise” the idea of
playing it safe by sticking to a potentially outmoded paradigm seems to be a common practice among
policymakers. David Corn highlights the difficulty in secretive organizations, “How do you get any
bureaucracy- particularly a clandestine one- to behave creatively and responsibly? Inertia and infighting
have often derailed well-intentioned intelligence reform…” See “Impaired Intelligence”, David Corn, The
Nation, 23 September, 2002, pp. 6-7.
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It seems that the genesis of policymakers’ conceptual rigidity appears to be a
product of subconscious necessity in coping with ambiguity, and not a result of
consciously adopting the most optimal choice from among competing policy
alternatives73. This appears to be a key element to consider, as it bolsters Zegart’s causal
logic; mentioned earlier in this chapter.
Turf wars are also palpable at every level. Such impediments seem to further
hamper clarity and infect the decision-making process. For national security bureaucrats,
turf is often a major concern; yet it is to the detriment of national security itself. “A
government agency that surrenders turf, even turf it doesn’t particularly want, signals
weaknesses that may invite further raids by competing agencies, as the CIA is learning to
its sorrow.”74
This last point should not be taken lightly; as it illustrates the conditions under
which the national security apparatus was constructed following The Second World War.
Its persistence also informs the debates on reorganization that had followed each
commission charged with investigating subsequent “intelligence failures.”75
Organizational Tendencies and Political Realities
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The cognitive limitations of the human mind, time, and available information (in our case, intelligence)
have been noted by James March and Herbert Simon (among others) as salient factors in creating the
bounded rationality within which decision makers must operate. Their works will be cited in the final
chapter.
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Remaking Domestic Intelligence, Richard A. Posner, (Stanford, CA: Hoover Press, 2005), p. 29.
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See Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC, Amy B. Zegart (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1999). This work will be referenced again, near the end of this chapter.
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One’s organizational association also accounts for the mental set to which
members tend to cling76. Organizations have their own culture77. Their members are
most likely to view problems, causation and perhaps solutions through such a cultural
prism78. If an organization is suited to adaptation, it is a function of humility and
learning how to learn that will galvanize its evolution79.
Members of an organization, particularly career officials, come to believe that the health
of their organization is vital to the national interest. The health of the organization, in
turn, is seen to depend on maintaining influence, fulfilling its mission, and securing the
80
necessary capabilities.

This leads to the topic of organizational learning, which will be revisited in the
following chapter. Graham Allison has built on the work of James March and Herbert
Simon (among others) that informs us of the means through which change (read:
76

Heur, “Strategic Deception and Counterdeception”, p. 323. There is also an appealing quality of
belonging to an elite organization. One may sense that in insulating and protecting the organization’s focus
becomes less and less attached to the rationale that established its existence. This point is generally
formulated from a variety of sources, of which one stands out: “An Approach to a Theory of Bureaucracy”,
Phillip Selznick, American Sociological Review, Vol. 8, No. 1, (Feb., 1943), pp. 47-54.
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Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It, James Q. Wilson, (US: Basic Books,
1989). Insofar as “organizational culture” is concerned, Wilson defines the term as “… a persistent,
patterned way of thinking about the central tasks of and human relationships within an organization.
Culture is to an organization what personality is to an individual.” See p. 91.
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How organizations view themselves in terms of where they fit in is a point to consider. For instance, in
the pre-9/11 world the FBI had not truly viewed itself, “…as part of the national security apparatus and did
not share information with the national security community.” See “Strategic Surprise and the September
11 Attacks”, Daniel Byman, Annual Review of Political Science, 2005; 8: 145-170, quote on p. 159.
Byman also stresses that CIA had logically focused where they were mandated to: outside of the U.S.
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The preceding sentences are an attempt to summarize Schein’s work on organizational adaptation and
becoming a perpetual learning organization. Organizational Culture and Leadership, Edgar H. Schein
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, third edition, 2004); pp. 88, 97, 108, 389-397. Jack S. Levy describes the
complexities of the organizational learning process, which must start with the individual in the
organization. See Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield”,
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2 (Spring, 1994), 279-312. Exactly how complex is discussed on
pp. 283- 289.
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Graham T. Allison and Morton H. Halperin, “Bureaucratic Politics: A Paradigm and Some Policy
Implications”, World Politics, Vol.24, Supplement: Theory and Policy in International Relations, (Spring,
1972), p. 48. They also apply this idea to intelligence organizations on p. 59, “Intelligence organizations
are not perfect and neutral transmission belts. They notice what their images of the world lead them to
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procedures and in ways designed to protect their own organizational interests.” The next chapter will
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view as the essence of the organization’s activity, e.g., flying for the Air Force.”
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adaptation) takes place. Allison has made the point that changes do occur in
organizations, but “Learning occurs gradually, over time. Dramatic organizational
change occurs in response to major disasters.”81
For all the recommendations that have been made for reforming the IC over the
second half of the 20th Century, few have centered on “understanding the basic mission of
intelligence and how it must adapt to changes in the larger society, economy and global
environment”82. The “containment” organizing principle83 that guided national security
concerns throughout the Cold War had not yielded an equally concise concept during the
post-Cold War “Information Age.” Therefore, re-organizing a community that has an
embedded culture is perhaps the hardest task of all84. As Berkowitz and Goodman have
stated, “Whether the intelligence community will adapt to the Information Age depends
much on whether its culture can adapt. The record of bureaucracies adapting to changing
conditions is not encouraging. Bureaucracies are insulated from most of the forces that
make other organizations adapt.”85
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Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Graham T. Allison, (Boston: Little, Brown
and Company, 1971); p. 68. Some of the accelerating conditions of organizational learning and change are:
budgetary feast, prolonged budgetary failure and dramatic performance failures (as repeated on p. 85:
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Best Truth: Intelligence in the Information Age, Bruce D. Berkowitz and Allan E. Goodman, (New
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Ibid.; p. 3.
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become irrelevant, or it will “muddle along until a catastrophe exposes the organization’s unseen
weaknesses” (also on p. 165). Elsewhere, Berkowitz and Goodman discuss the problems that secrecy and
compartmentalization produces within the IC and between the IC and the policymakers. The secrecy
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investigations. Strategic Intelligence for American National Security, (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton
University Press, 1989), Chapter Five: “Intelligence and Problems of Organization”, pp. 110- 136.
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31

Charles Perrow has noted that “Politics changes drastically when large
organizations appear. Politicians come from them, work through them, and are beholden
to them.”86 That being said, national security bureaucracies do exhibit some of the
negative qualities mentioned above. Still, this paper is not taking a cynical view of
bureaucracies; rather it is placing them in context, so that the reader may see more clearly
the inefficiencies that tend to inhibit the adaptation process. Bureaucracies should not be
viewed with an absolute contempt for their existence, but with an understanding of their
origins, roles, and interconnectedness to policy and society. In a related point, Perrow
argues the following:
Bureaucracy was not a demonic invention of evil elites; it simply offered elites an assist
that gave them unprecedented (but anticipated) control over the society, given the scope
and complexity of that society, since it provided such exquisite control over the
87
institutions that were absorbing society- the bureaucracies they were establishing.

This paper is not so much about organizations as it is about how adaptation is
enabled, or disabled. In this chapter there is some discussion of the organizational
learning that has or has not taken place within the IC, as it relates to changes in the threat
Fall 2001, Vol. 45, Issue 4. This was also discussed in Best Truth, referenced as a “Virtual Corporation”
(pp. 75-82) and “Market-Based Management” (pp. 82-83).
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environment. The next chapter looks at how the defense establishment has or has not
been adaptable in relation to unconventional war fighting. This discourse is meant to set
the stage for understanding what forces lay outside the control of the organization that
may be more significant to study; namely, strategic choices and mechanisms that promote
or prevent adaptation.
Two Cases: Iran and Iraq
In a recently declassified postmortem on the 1979 Iranian Revolution and the Iraq
WMD debacle (not yet fully declassified), Robert Jervis has produced a most insightful
and honest accounting of the CIA’s missteps. What is equally important, are the reasons
for failure that reside in both the political sphere as well as the analytical realm88. There
are a number of key points that lend credence to Zegart’s findings that politics more often
are at fault than the IC itself. Though this seems to be a correct assessment of the Iraqi
WMD mishap, the opposite seems to be correct for the Iranian Revolution’s emergence.
The messy middle ground between producers and consumers is explored with some
depth. Both cases are useful for understanding how the IC is able to fail. To better
summarize Jervis’s findings it may be useful to bullet them below.
The Iranian Revolution (Failure from within the IC?)
•

Neither the analysts, nor the policymakers applied the social science
methodological approach to intelligence. “… CIA officers writing on Iran were
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more like journalists than social scientists.”89 Peer review was not viewed as a
valuable endeavor. It was to their estimative detriment.
•

The IC had been linguistically challenged in that there were “… almost no
Americans on the scene [who] spoke good Farsi.”90 Though cables from the State
Department’s in-country personnel were on the mark, it went unnoticed at CIA.

•

The expectation that the Shah would eventually engage the growing unrest by
military suppression was based on his past performances (as recent as 1977),
which did not take into account his more recent character changes. 91 It was
logical, but ultimately erroneous.

•

Policymakers devote their time to the most pressing issues of the day. As the
Iranian unrest was viewed as mostly blowing off steam, it was not of immediate
concern to policymakers, which in turn explains CIA’s lack of dedication to the
protesters92.
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•

Open-source (OSINT in IC parlance) sources and interaction with the universe of
academic experts would most likely have produced some key disconfirming
evidence to generate the discovery of alternative explanations.

•

Both analysts and policymakers had mistakenly judged the Shah’s liberalization
program as being beneficial to his population; mirror imaging can be a dangerous
blunder. Though the Shah’s main concern was the handover of his throne and
rule to his son, it clashed with his desire to westernize his country. Further, his
drive to liberalize more rapidly seems to have caused social displacement93.

•

There was a faulty belief that the protest movement would somehow divide into
factions that were easier to suppress. This never happened.

•

The role of religion was underestimated in Iranian society. Related to the above
conjecture that the factions would split was the surprise that Ayatollah Khomeini
had managed to subjugate his co-religionist Ayatollahs. What was even more
surprising was that the central role of religion had the effect of solidarity on the
populace. As the Shah was viewed as the worse of two evils, Ayatollah
Khomeini’s strong faction was appealing not so much for its religiosity, but for its
revolutionary appeal to the poor. Even the secular elites realized reluctantly that
if they didn’t get on board bad things could happen to them.

•

The analysts had never realized how much the Shah’s subjects had hated him.

•

The fact that there were so many demonstrations may have dulled their
significance to the analysts. In other words, there was a sense that the common
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practice of public protestation had not been cause for alarm, but rather a
reaffirmation of views already held about Iranian society.
•

The intra-IC sharing and challenging of assumptions was mostly absent.
(Economic analysts and political analysts seemed not to posit their own sense of
the situation, so that their contradictory assumptions did not produce the requisite
analytical discord that may yield a more comprehensive and accurate depiction of
the breadth and depth of the disorder in Iran).

There were many reasons why the fall of the Shah was missed by Western
intelligence (read: American IC). Culturally there was difficulty understanding how
religion could play such a central role in politics, as it was generally viewed in the West
as two influences that should not cross paths (a secular bias)94. In fact, one could say that
religious leaders in Iran are analogous to Congressmen in the U.S95. They are the
spokespersons for the voiceless, and they operate with the knowledge that their
repression would be very costly for the government.
The Shah’s liberalization policies seemed to have been running counter to his
autocratic rule. There appears to have been a direct relationship between the speed of
reform and the intensity of civil unrest. Further, though the Shah’s self-image had been
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deteriorating (along with his physical health), he appeared to cling to the idea that his rule
was benign96.
Jervis had explored the possible effects of policy bias on the analysts, but was not
able to detect a patent influence97. It is in the dissenting remarks from senior members of
CIA that supports the idea that politics mattered just as much- perhaps more than, the
analytical failings. Bruce Palmer is rather critical of the postmortem:
... the analysis did not delve very deeply into US policy aspects which had enormous
influence over both the analytical and operational/collection sides of the Intelligence
Community. Thus, a broader examination of the matter would no doubt lead to some much
different conclusions. In my own view, our ‘failure’ in Iran was considerably more one of a
policy nature, to include the lack of adequate policy-intelligence linkage, than an intelligence
98
breakdown.

Though Klaus Knorr agrees that policy influence was not discovered, he does
concede that it is possible that it has yet to be discerned:
US policy toward the Shah may well have had a major impact on Iranian developments.
In ways as yet unclear and speculative, the intelligence failure may have resulted in part
from this policy, (a) in terms of structuring attention to Iranian realities and the
procurement of information; (b) in terms of discouraging intelligence analysts from
pursuing questions that might have been, or were felt to be, uncomfortable to
policymakers (because they were assumed to cross the boundary between intelligence
and policymaking) and (c)- and perhaps most of all- because US policy helped to bring
99
about the actual course of events in Iran.
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Knorr makes another point in the above. Item “(b)” indicates the sensitive subject
of boundaries and a potential for not wanting to cross them, in an effort to stay true to the
singular mission to report and not meddle in policymaking. William Leonhart highlights
the “relation between policy and analysis.”100 His view is that the collaboration between
the two was profitable to some extent:
It does not seem to have occurred to the authors that a closer relationship between
policymakers and the Intelligence Community might have had advantages in assessing
the implications or consequences of policy options before decisions were taken on the
101
directions and use of US influence.

Leonhart continues his criticism of the postmortem by underscoring the authors’
biases, and its transference to the postmortem:
These reflections seem part of those ‘general beliefs’, about which the authors dilate
elsewhere, that they feel largely pre-determined the subsequent analysis of the Iranian
problem. Their view of analysts, particularly those at senior level, seems curiously
constricted. But those who hold similar organizational preferences will no doubt be more
responsive to the line of criticism which the authors make of NFAC performance during
the period reviewed- criticism which in turn generally reinforce their predilections on
desirable organizational mold. The point is not so much that the authors’ arguments are
right or wrong, but that their implicit assumption appears to color much of their own
102
analysis.”

In essence, the postmortem of the Iranian Revolution seems to indicate that there
is some politicization, but it appears to different participants in different forms and
degrees of influence.
The Iraq WMD Intelligence Failure (Comprehensive Failure?)
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It has been suggested that whereas the IC had failed on 11 September, 2001 to
deliver enough warning, in the case of the Iraqi WMDs it had over-compensated by
“providing too much.”103 As it was suggested earlier in this paper, focusing on intentions
rather than capabilities is a more arduous task. The failure to discover WMDs in Iraq
was a consequence of the failure to understand intentions, while focused on capabilities.
Further sustaining this supposition was the secretive tone that Saddam Hussein had
maintained, while attempting to circumvent UN resolutions to stop the flow of nonemergency goods. It was later learned that Hussein had simply wanted this uncertainty to
deter his nemesis: Iran. This failure was influenced by the specious belief that he had
been pursuing a WMD program, as well as the attendant stockpiles, and associated
equipment to produce WMDs. Jervis argues that the conclusions reached about the
existence of Saddam’s WMD program was logical. Absent any strong disconfirming
evidence, the same conclusion may have been reached, irrespective of the shock of 11
September. Whatever the policymakers would have decided was not for the IC to
influence.
The surreptitious procurement procedures that Hussein had used to acquire what
was determined to be single-use weapons material had encouraged the theory that he had
something to hide. Both the political and intelligence communities shared this mistaken
assumption. Each one seems to have had a reinforcing effect upon the other. One could
conclude that the policy-intelligence relationship had been corrupted to some degree. If
so, this would exemplify the negative form of politicization104. Robert Jervis has
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criticized the received wisdom that the IC was improperly reliant on the Western
consensus (Britain, Australia, etc.). He claims that the investigation that had followed the
“intelligence failure” was flawed for the same reasons as the original failure that was
being investigated: “the postmortems neglected social science methods, settled for more
intuitive but less adequate ways of thinking, and jumped to plausible but misleading
conclusions.”105
Connecting the Dots
External Loci of Responsibility
Insofar as “adaptation” is concerned, it appears that “overlearning” from past
mistakes had occurred.106 With the 11 September attacks being such a recent and
impactful event it would have naturally provided an incentive to adapt to the new threat
environment as it was believed to be. This led to over-correcting the warning function
regarding the new threat. The resultant stress placed on the IC had contributed to
“…premature cognitive closure.”107 This created an atmosphere conducive to
misadventures.
Further, given that intelligence serves policy, any potential alternative
explanations would have been difficult to impart for two reasons. First, there were
on 21 June, 2006, DNI (Director of National Intelligence) John D. Negroponte did respond to the Chairman
of the House Permanent Select Committee Pete Hoekstra’s request for a declassified “key points”
memoranda summarizing NGIC’s (National Ground Intelligence Center) findings. Most of the points had
consisted of the common conjecture linking terrorists’ pursuits to acquire WMD with the WMD that
actually was recovered. However, the DNI did state in his opening point that, “Since 2003 Coalition forces
have recovered approximately 500 weapons munitions which contain degraded mustard or sarin nerve
agent.” Still, the recovery of a degraded inventory merely implies that there were weapons at one point, but
does not have the force of claiming that there is a current stockpile.
105
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weaker indicators that Saddam’s WMD program was dead; however, such a possibility
that could not provide strong disconfirming evidence would have been costly. It would
have conflicted profoundly with the administration’s view of Iraq in the context of the
post-9/11 threat environment. As Steve Chan notes, “… to some extent decision makers
legitimately discount warnings from dubious sources (e.g., Cuban refugees, spies like
Richard Sorge), sources which are ideologically suspicious (e.g., Churchill and Roosevelt
for Stalin, Panikkar for Truman), or sources with a track record of false alarms…”108
The obverse side of the coin explains the subtle, yet ever-present recognition of
one’s position and purpose relative to the consuming powers that be:
Like other bureaucrats, intelligence analysts have to conform to the regime’s basic views
about the nature and morality of international relations if they wish to be treated as
‘responsible’ and ‘serious’. Therefore, they refrain from asking the really ‘tough’ but
crucial questions such as the aggressiveness of the Soviet Union, the morality of the
109
Vietnam War, and the validity of the ‘domino theory.’

Being that the IC was alleged to have blundered in 2001, as a result of not having
had enough confirmatory evidence, it was rather hesitant to commit the same error again.
(As mentioned above, 9/11 was more a failure to connect the dots, whereas the Iraq
WMD debacle was the result of an overabundance of dots that were hastily connected- or
misconnected).
Secondly, there was a sense that the upper echelons of political power had their
own “reliable” sources that were in keeping with the assessment that Saddam posed a
grave risk to U.S. interests in the region. The cost of making a weak case that the

108

Steve Chan, “The Intelligence of Stupidity: Understanding Failures in Strategic Warning”, The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Mar., 1979), 171-180; p. 172.
109
Ibid.; p. 178.

41

administration was wrong would have caused political and psychological discomfort and
might have risked calling into question the IC’s loyalty.
Even Congress fell into the same category. Under the conditions of the new
threat environment- and the rawness of the recent pain that was so deep, most politicians
could not afford to seem soft on terrorism and WMD. The rally-around-the-flag
mentality built the bandwagon that most had ridden on the path to war.110
Shared Loci of Responsibility
Logic and the history of the IC (and other organizations) give few grounds for optimism.
Because intelligence is unpopular and better intelligence may be even more unpopular,
political leaders are likely to be content with decrying intelligence’s performance.

-Robert Jervis111
The central theme of this paper is adaptation failure as it concerns the IC.
However, after reviewing the case of the Iranian Revolution of 1979 (and the less in-
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depth Iraq WMD mishap), it appears that there is, at minimum, a shared failure between
policymakers and the IC. In accordance with academic honesty, there is a conscious
attempt to remain skeptical about Zegart’s theory. This paper will not duplicate, nor
supplant her work in any form; simply building upon it is the objective here.
Nonetheless, there seem to be some variegated gradations of failure that fall into
the intelligence-policy realm. While it is not surprising to see this trend, it is a bit
disquieting to come to the partial conclusion thus far that the space between the two looks
more like an abyss; or more pessimistically, a black hole. If this characterization is
accurate- and it may not be, it allows for each end of the “intelligence cycle” to dodge
accountability. If it is not party A’s fault and it is not party B’s fault, then it could be
more comfortable for each party to point the culpable finger in the direction of that grey
area between the two.
At the end of the day, however, the intelligence function is a consumer-driven
pursuit. The IC exists to produce timely, accurate and relevant information on the issues
that are most important to consumers. At a colloquium held at Georgetown on 30
November, 1994, then Representative Lee Hamilton had counted himself as an
intelligence consumer for three decades, as he noted:
There needs to be much broader agreement on the priorities of intelligence, which
ought to be driven by the foreign policy objectives of the United States.
Sometimes I think we just collect intelligence for the thrill of collecting it, to show how
good we are at it. This is not the fault of the Intelligence Community; it is a fault of the
policymakers. We don’t make clear to the Intelligence Community what the priorities
112
really are.
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Such a pronouncement from the policymaking side of the intelligence cycle seems
to jump out at the reader a bit. That was in 1994! Former NSC staffer and CIA Middle
East specialist Reuel Marc Gerecht has taken a rather cynical view toward the mismatch
between Washington’s view of their impact on the world and the reality that it appears to
be in stark contrast with their purported national security priorities:
I think it’s very, very much true that senior officials in Washington often think they’re
doing a great deal about a national security issue. But out in the field, whether it’s with
the CIA in stations and bases or the FBI in the United States—in actual practice, they’re
actually not doing very much at all. I mean, I certainly remember many instances when I
was overseas with the agency, and I would be seeing commentary either in the press or in
official statements about what we were doing overseas, and certainly it didn’t match at all
113
what the practice was.

In an interesting parallel set of conditions, both the Iraq WMD mishap and the
Yom Kippur “surprise” attack seem to have each suffered from over-reliance on a single
source. In each case, the source received special attention from the highest policymaking
elements in the respective governments. Thought to be more accurate than any other
intelligence that could have been gathered through “conventional” means, both the U.S.
in 2001 and Israel in 1973 had been sucked into a carefully scripted plot that had ripple
effects long after the subsequent wars. In the former, the source was “Curveball”114,
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whereas in the latter it was “The In-Law” 115, who had duped the Israelis in the lead-up to
the 1973 war. In each case the “reliable” source turned out not to be so reliable after all.
Even though CIA had judged Curveball to be unreliable, the warning that he was
a fabricator went unheeded by the policymaking political class. As can be seen in this
case, discrepant information was not granted much, if any, attention. As noted above,
there are strong human tendencies that resist psychologically discomforting information.
In the case of the In-Law, his disinformation campaign had been so well crafted that he
was able to convince the Israelis that there would be an Egyptian attack in October
(which was true), but gave the Egyptians a 4-hour lead.
Internal Loci of Responsibility:

This paper may appear to favor the IC over the policymakers. This is not the
case. In order to balance the idea that adaptation failure was a unique product of
policymaking origin, it is necessary to look at failures from within the IC. Prima facie,
this may appear somewhat to be hampering Zegart’s hypothesis that politics were to
115
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blame. Nonetheless, looking at both the consumers and producers is useful in that it
allows flaws to be revealed for what they are. Metaphorically, to see either a tree or a
forest and not walk through the forest to observe individual trees is tantamount to
committing to tunnel vision.
In the above analysis of the 1979 Iranian Revolution, many of the failures came
from all directions, but the IC had more than its fair share. Regarding the 9/11 attacks,
agencies within the IC, the FBI in particular, were held to the illogical preferences of
their top leader. As reported in The New York Times:
[Former FBI Director] Mr. Freeh was notoriously averse to using computers himself—he
did not like to use e-mail, for example—and his critics have attacked him as failing to
commit himself to upgrading the bureau’s system. The bureau’s computers were so
inadequate that after the Sept. 11 attacks, the bureau had to send photographs of the
116
hijackers by overnight mail because they were unable to e-mail them.

What was equally disturbing was that Senator Charles E. Schumer (D-NY) had
expressed how this was not news, and it was common knowledge that the FBI had
suffered from this technological shortcoming for years117. If it were known to have
plagued the agency for so long, one would think that Congressional oversight committees
would have called attention to it and compelled Mr. Freeh to bring his agency up to the
standard of his counterparts in the IC. So, while there are deficiencies within the IC’s top
leadership, there is a historical record of apathy- and a concomitant lack of
accountability-118 from the Congressional oversight system that monitors the IC, seizes
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on a glaring problem, makes recommendations, and evaluates the progression (or
stagnation) of adaptability to the changed environment.
Theoretical Gaps and Semantic Obfuscation
Theoretical Absence
Though we have defined “adaptation failure” to be more in concert with Zegart’s
definition there may be some who feel it isn’t parsimonious enough119. However, it is in
keeping with the social science necessity to have a mental framework with which to
work. The alternative being that no revolutionary theoretical advancement would
materialize. What is most troublesome is that there is a persistent deficiency with studies
of intelligence: there is no agreed-upon “Theory of Intelligence.” This is an important
point, which serious scholars have elucidated on numerous occasions past and present:
From years of reading and reflection on strategic intelligence, I am convinced that the
functions of intelligence constitute the largest gap in understanding how foreign policy
decisions are made. Discussions of intelligence “failure” abound, but we lack an
acceptable theory of intelligence that permits systematic evaluations of performance by
120
clearly defined criteria.
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policymakers to implement the more important recommendations that were crafted prior to 9-11.
Supporting this point, she does note the policymakers as deserving of some blame, but more importantly,
she is dealing with the question of why the reforms were not able to proceed, even with the heads of CIA
and FBI in agreement with many of them.
120
“Being Intelligent about Secret Intelligence Agencies”, Harry Howe Ransom, The American Political
Science Review, Vol. 74, No. 1. (Mar., 1980), pp. 141-148; quote from p. 147 (Emphasis supplied).
Ransom also discusses how secrecy is an impediment, which tends to amplify the already difficult study of

47

The paucity of theoretical propositions regarding intelligence is in large part,
unfortunately, due to the cultural secrecy and compartmentalization between and within
the various intelligence agencies121. The IC itself has been described as a “loose
confederation”, whose cultural norms preclude the discovery of elements that might assist
in forming a theory122. “Thus CIA was (and, we suspect, is yet) a confederacy, in some
respects similar to the Pentagon.”123 As Daniel Byman makes clear:
Many of the problems of the CIA, the FBI, the military, and other institutions involved in
counterterrorism can be laid, at least in part, at the feet of policy makers. It is the duty of
elected officials to impose their will on unelected elements of the government, and they
the subject by scholars. He also mentions a secondary impact of the secretive nature of intelligence:
morality is reduced by covert actions that sometimes require ethical misdeeds. E.g. subversion, inciting
riots, playing on the weaknesses of others, fomenting discontent and furthering armed revolt, murder, and
dealing with unsavory people whose human rights violations are well documented. As the 1970s had
revealed many embarrassing facts about the IC, commissions convened and their recommendations had
followed. Few of them were implemented, but assassination was stricken from practice (Executive Order
11905) , and the President had to notify approximately six committees of covert action (the Hughes-Ryan
Act, later replaced by the Intelligence Oversight Act). Dealing with human rights violators was later
forbidden in the 1990s (the so-called “Deutch guidelines”, named after the DCI at the time John Deutcsh).
On the legislative history of the interplay between Congress, the president and the IC see Loch Johnson
(cited above) “The U.S. Congress and the CIA”; and also by Johnson, “Legislative Reform of Intelligence
Policy”, Polity, Vol. 17. No. 3 (Spring, 1985), pp. 549-573.
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have the authority to do so. Policy makers, however, did a poor job imposing their will
124
on various bureaucracies that were not aggressive in counterterrorism.

Building and improving upon a clear understanding of what an intelligence theory
would look like is impeded further by the parochial concerns within the IC; e.g., the drive
to maintain autonomy, insulation, and organizational survival, as it is common practice in
most organizations.125 Perhaps the reason for the absence of a theory of intelligence has
to do with the way in which national security agencies are configured in their embryonic
phase. According to Zegart, the very creation of the modern IC was a function of interservice rivalry and partial compromise that led to it being “flawed by design.”126
The development of national security agencies being forged out of inter-service
rivalry, political maneuvering and presidential weakness yields a paradox of sorts:
national security agencies are supposed to deal with national interests127, but if
insufficiently designed, they may not fulfill their purported ethos.
Semantic Haze
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See Byman, “Strategic Surprise and the September 11 Attacks” (cited earlier), p. 161.
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The semantic matter revolves around the terms used to describe what needs to
happen to the IC in order to “fix” it. It may seem trivial to mention; however, there are
differences in the concepts “reform”, “evolution”, “revolution” and “transformation”128
that seem to have implications, which may offer insight into why it is presumed to be
“broken.” When the term “broken” is used to characterize the IC, it undoubtedly implies
that the resolution is to “fix” it. Similarly, when designating a successful surprise attack
as a “failure” for the target state, there is a tendency to presuppose that successfully
thwarting the plot of the attacking party indicates the absence of failure.
To better illustrate the above discussion, it may be useful to imagine a
counterfactual scenario. For example, the 9-11 commission had found eleven
opportunities that were missed by the IC. If one of those opportunities was seized uponhence foiling the attack in part, or in whole- would it be fair to say that the IC’s “success”
negated the remaining ten? It would not be an accurate judgment for two reasons. First,
if the attack was realized in advance, the ten remaining elements that purportedly defined
the failure would not have been addressed. Second, the attack may have proceeded,
perhaps producing less damage, and obviating the need for a commission to find fault in
the IC. This topic is not going to be covered here, but simply raising the point may
stimulate further research.
Recommending Reorganization as a Political Safety Net
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March and Olson have shown that the mere public assertion that there needs to be
reorganization is all that is required to gain public support. Even if no change follows, it
is better politically for both Congress and the President to have made calls for
reorganization, irrespective of whether such reforms occur129. In large part this seems to
explain why so many committees’ recommendations for reorganization and retrofitting
go unheeded and are not subject to repercussions. It is a political “dog and pony” show
approach to address the public (electing constituents’) concerns with government
response to publicized failures. This bold assertion is supportive of Zegart’s “enduring
realities” mentioned earlier130. As Richard Betts so eloquently brings to light:
Those informed insiders who propose a revolution in intelligence tend to become
ambivalent when they consider the risks. [Deborah] Barger, for example, endorses
concurrent revolution and evolution, ‘parallel processes’ and ‘competing streams of
change activity’ that combine bold experimentation and gradualism. This is theoretically
possible, just as an emphasis on the high-technology forces and strategies of the
revolution in military affairs [RMA] should be able to coexist with old-fashioned, lowtech counterinsurgency in the Defense Department. But such a combination is very hard
131
to manage. It is difficult to turn a system upside down and tweak it at the same time.

Chapter Summary
So far, we have looked at some of the links in the chain of failure that have
usually been associated with the IC. However, we have gone beyond that prism in an
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effort to understand what the “chain” truly represents. Therefore, it could be said that
while intelligence failures are inevitable, there are forces at play beyond the IC’s control
that may induce or facilitate such failures. In the next chapter, we will attempt to
determine whether there have been similar influential relationships in the realm of
military doctrinal development.
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Chapter 2: Strategic Adaptation and War
Methods of Analysis
To truly apply Zegart’s adaptation failure theory to the military, a much longer
and more in-depth study would be in order. As there are inherent limitations on this
paper’s length, depth, and breadth the objective now is to seek whether or not the
hypothetical core precepts are indeed as apparent as they are assumed to be. As this
paper asserts, there should be elements of a political quality that shade strategic choices
regarding military action. To keep in perfect step with Zegart would be impossible, as
we are dealing with a much larger set of organizations under the Department of Defense
(DoD).
Where the “enduring realities” are concerned, it should be recalled that the
impediments to adaptation are centered on the nature of bureaucratic organizations,
political actors’ rational self-interest, and national security bureaucrats’ interests. In the
case of the military, this task seems a bit less difficult as the element of secrecy plays a
less important role. However, what makes it more difficult is the vast amount of publicly
available material with which to sift and reduce to digestible quality. Therefore, this
chapter will take a slightly different approach in terms of style and method.
In order to demonstrate the significance of adaptation failure in a military context,
a few “conventional” conflicts deserve brief attention. The aim being to identify the
pitfalls that result from the perpetually repetitive missteps associated with mis-learning
the lessons of previous conflicts. Also, it is hoped that the reader begins to develop a
sense of failure stemming from the tenacious attachment to a failing strategy. Following
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this review there will be more focus on the forms of combat that lay outside the
traditional force-on-force pitched battles that have consumed so much attention in the
past centuries. Then, we will briefly identify the context of the counterinsurgency
literature, which will hopefully provide the reader with an understanding of the stark
contrast between COIN and traditional views of warfare. This should set the stage for the
final discussion regarding the necessary aspects that create learning organizations, which
are capable of adaptation and the conditions under which politico-military dynamics tend
to enable (or enfeeble) them.
Conventional Wars
The First World War
Should a new war be fought without regard to the evolution of emerging threats it
will be at one’s own peril. This unfortunate phenomenon had occurred in World War
One (WWI). As European states had approached the emerging possibilities of a Great
Power War, a “Cult of the Offensive”132 mental framework had materialized. It became
more obvious only after the belligerents became bogged down in the trenches on the
Western Front that a grave miscalculation was made. The offense-defense balance was
misunderstood to have been more favorable to the offense when in fact conditions were

132

See “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, Stephen Van Evera,
International Security, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (Summer, 1984), 58-107. Also, see the partial refutation on the
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International Security, Vol. 11, no. 2, (Fall 1986), pp. 151-175. Sagan asserts that the requirements of
secret alliances had fed European desires to strike the first blow, lest they be left to negotiate a peace in a
disadvantageous position.
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quite the opposite133. Thus, the strategy was supplanted by a defense-dominant
orientation. This is in every sense an example of a mismatch between means and ends.
The Second World War
It is a common criticism of military leaders that they are always planning to “fight
the last war”; that is, the previous war that was fought. As a defense-dominant
understanding was so painfully learned in WWI, it would soon be succeeded by an
offense-dominant Blitzkrieg campaign of firepower and maneuver in The Second World
War134. This is not an uncommon phenomenon, nor is it limited temporally and spatially
to early or mid-20th Century Europe (as will be shown later in this paper).135
When incorrectly gauging one’s threat environment based on outmoded thinking,
a strategic miscalculation may follow and eventually catastrophe may be the unintended
consequence. So, it could be said that a tenacious attachment to one’s sense of comfort in
assuming that the threat environment remains static may inadvertently negate such
thinking if one does not reconfigure their approach to suit the possibility that such
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accepted wisdom is no longer applicable136. This conceptual rigidity is particularly
hazardous if the signs of environmental change are observable, but dismissed out of hand.
The 1991 Persian Gulf War
After Iraq’s Army had crossed its southern border, successfully invaded, and
occupied Kuwait in August of 1990, the combined coalition forces (under the auspices of
the UN) had reversed the aggression and returned the region to the status quo ante
bellum.137 The heavy application of conventional firepower and maneuver, combined
with the initial (and continuous) application of air power and an overall American
technological supremacy had proved efficacious. The 1991 Persian Gulf War was
perhaps the last known successful conventional endeavor in modern warfare.
The Space between Conventional and Unconventional Wars
The reader may notice that the Vietnam and Korean Wars were not addressed
here. They will be taken up shortly, as they did not fit neatly into the conventional war
typology. In the early 1980s a new strategy began to dominate the American DoD: Air
Land Battle.138 This doctrine held that the Army would need a variety of mostly heavy
land forces coupled with CAS (Close Air Support) from the Air Force to win any
conventional wars to come. It was based on the Cold War idea that if an East-West
nuclear war had not erupted, a conventional war might. Hence, preparedness for that
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possible mode of combat needed consideration. This was largely an effort to match the
echelon-based Soviet doctrine of the time as it related to the projected European theater.
The Air Force, however, had viewed CAS as less than prestigious. They
preferred the WWII long-range strategic bombing approach139. The growing pains of the
Air Land Battle paradigm were painfully evident in Grenada during Operation Urgent
Fury.140 The operations in Grenada, Panama and Haiti are considered to exist somewhere
between the realm of conventional and unconventional forms of warfare. As far as the
intensity spectrum of conflict is concerned, they were low.141
Unconventional Wars and Asymmetry
Usage of the terms “conventional war” should be interpreted as conflict that is
non-nuclear and descriptive of the forms of warfare that have been commonplace
between and amongst the Great Powers throughout centuries past. There are, of course,
developments in technology and war-craft that have altered the means employed in
conducting combat142, but the concept survives. “Unconventional war” in this paper
refers to that which lies outside of the realm of the aforementioned. This may lead to
“asymmetric warfare”; that is, a concept describing the correlation of forces as it relates
139
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to a mismatch in capabilities between adversaries. This condition may lead one or more
inferior belligerents to attempt to offset the conventional power disparity by means that
seek to circumvent enemy strengths and exploit enemy weaknesses.143
Korea, Conventional, or Unconventional?
The Korean War was in many ways a conventional campaign. There were tanks,
planes, infantry and artillery. However, both the North Koreans and the Chinese had
opted for a form of combat that was very much a part of recent Far Eastern history:
guerilla warfare144. North Korea had at the ready “a large, well-equipped, well-trained
guerilla force that had infiltrated into South Korea to instigate an insurgency.”145 What is
relevant to this paper is that the NKPA (North Korean People’s Army) had both a
conventional and unconventional array of forces at their disposal. The United States did
not.
From early on (26 October, 1950), the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
had ordered the People’s Volunteer Army (Chinese People’s Volunteers- CPV) to
surreptitiously cross the border with North Korea and engage the U.S. Army in a hit-andrun assault, or guerilla-style warfare. The sole purpose for this belligerent act was to give
credibility to the previous warnings that encroaching on the Chinese sphere of influence
by crossing the 38th parallel would meet resistance. On 24 November 1950, it became
143
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apparent that the PRC’s (People’s Republic of China) warning went unheeded. As a
result, the CPV became fully engaged and committed to turning back the virtually
unencumbered progress. The CPV followed the American Eighth Army’s advance with a
very forceful counter-attack and pushed the Americans south into a defensive
retrograde146.
There was no denying that the CPV had chosen to use infiltration and night
operations, enveloping the American-led UN forces and causing their rearguard and
vanguard elements to fight for their southern retreat. It took a month or so, but General
Ridgway had identified some of the American Eighth Army’s weaknesses. This included
low morale, a tendency to remain road-bound, thinking in terms of a conventional WWII
force-on-force approach, and a bunker mentality.
The American Experience with Irregular Warfare in Korea
Ridgway had made the appropriate requests to support his soldiers, boosting their
morale and fighting strength. He had also ordered his soldiers to constantly engage the
enemy where they operated most effectively: the mountains. He had ordered all patrols,
including night patrols to be increased. Ridgway had also not only ordered all units to
travel in open jeeps, but had himself demonstrated this tactic. As a “… function of
cultural learning…”147 he had realized that the American soldier had to “…adapt to new
conditions and a new enemy.”148 In order to recover lost ground and lost spirit, General
Matthew B. Ridgway had to break with tradition and adjust to the changed threat
environment.
146
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Who Was Victorious and Why?
There probably is no definitive answer to the question of victory. What seems to
stand out is the marked difference from the prior decade’s war practice. This war was
limited, a foreign concept to most U.S. citizens. Taking up the cause of an isthmus on the
other side of the world, for a people that are culturally alien could not produce the same
level of domestic support in the United States that would have characterized the
potentially existential threat facing America’s allies in WWII. One main objective of the
UN forces was to return the NKPA back to their side of the 38th parallel. Another was to
destroy the NKPA. Both were accomplished.
On the other hand, fighting a limited war requires limited objectives, as opposed
to a total war’s aim: absolute victory. Fighting to a stalemate with the CPV and losing
initiative (and lives), while negotiating under static attrition warfare is hardly a decisive
victory. What is more, the service cultures had stymied the appropriate application of
force to meet the threat.149 The newly created Air Force (formerly the Army Air Force)
was enamored of its decisive role in WWII, a result of strategic bombing. As Adrian
Lewis assesses:
The Air Force entered the Korean War unprepared to fight the type of war required of it
by political leaders. The Tactical Air Command (TAC) was too low on the Air Force’s
list of priorities to adequately prepare for a limited war; in fact, by January 1949 the TAC
had been demoted to a planning headquarters stripped of its units and absorbed into the
Continental Air Command. Army protests and the arguments within the Air Force,
caused the restoration of the TAC in July of 1950. Nevertheless, the Strategic Air
Command had been the primary focus of the Air Force, receiving the majority of
resources – energy, intellect, budget, talent, and prestige. By experience, training,
doctrine, technology, and culture the Air Force was geared and oriented toward strategic
bombing and more total war. In limited wars, the Air Force could not fight the way it
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was designed or had planned. The Air Force, thus, had to adapt its strategic bombers and
150
other technologies to conduct tactical missions.

Though the Air Force did not see fit to employ strategic bombers in support of
ground operations, the Navy did. However, the Air Force made its best efforts to prevent
the Navy from doing so151. This was another example, among many like it, where interservice rivalry had produced very little benefit and a reinforced organizational rigidity.
Lessons Learned
It appears that the American forces in Korea learned very few lessons.
Even when U.S./UN air dominance was established (through the use of Navy Aircraft
Carriers), the CPV and NKPA employed the tactics of guerilla warfare to undermine its
effects. “Americans, however, would not learn this lesson. For America this conclusion
only meant that better technology was needed.”152 Unfortunately, this still seems to have
been true in Vietnam (and today as well). In Korea, the U.S. Army had to adapt during
war to meet the NKPA and CPV tactics (although too late to produce definitive results; a
stalemate that relied on defensive attrition could hardly be viewed as a victory).
Vietnam, Conventional, or Unconventional?
The Vietnam War was both conventional and unconventional. The North
Vietnamese Army and its Viet Cong cohorts were using subversion and unconventional
means of attack, supply, and movement. The American Army was stuck on the
conventional tactics and operations that reflected the strategy of meeting a modern
military. As patently obvious as it became, tanks could not operate in tunnels and forests,
150
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planes and helicopters could not see through thick jungle canopies, and soldiers focused
on finding and killing the enemy- while sacrificing the needs of the civilian populacecould never properly defeat a guerilla insurgency.153
The North Vietnamese had adopted a guerilla strategy until the period 1968-1972,
in which they had switched to a conventional approach154. The Americans had relied on
a conventional strategy that was predisposed to believe in the usefulness of air power as a
coercive implement of war. Due to the mismatch in strategy, the Americans could not
have achieved victory, as it would have required “… exploiting the vulnerabilities in the
opponent’s strategy”155. Robert A. Pape has analyzed the efficacy of airpower and
coercion and concluded that the only relatively successful American bombing campaigns
were Linebacker I and Linebacker II in 1972. He asserts that this success was a direct
result of the choice by North Vietnam to adopt a conventional war strategy, which in
effect had to rely on conventional support mechanisms that were vulnerable to
interdiction.
Conventional LOCs (Lines of Communication- such as roadways, railways,
airports, waterways, communication networks, etc.) serve conventional mechanized
forces. On the contrary, guerilla LOCs are not as significant to the maintenance of the
fighting units, and in fact run in the reverse order (from front to rear, whereas
153
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conventional LOCs run from rear to front)156. Guerillas operate in smaller units and
require little support from the rear. Their food supply is secured as they manipulate the
population and thus the center of gravity157. Pape found the main cause of failure to have
been American civilian and military leaders’ deficient thinking as it related to
“…American military action and the enemy’s goals”.158
The American Experience with Irregular Warfare in Vietnam
The American Army in Vietnam did not adapt to meet the changed threat
environment in Southeast Asia. It was not for a lack of knowledge that the enemy’s
preferred approach to combat was unconventional. In fact, Mao Tse-Tung had managed
to effectively employ guerilla warfare to secure and hold power in China (and wrote a
manual/book about it). What is more, unconventional guerilla approaches to war have
been successfully employed in Europe, North Africa, Asia, Cuba, etc.159 In referring to
guerilla warfare as “camouflaged war”, Sir Basil Henry Liddell Hart stated:
It is not too late to learn from the experience of history. However tempting the idea may
seem of replying to our opponents’ ‘camouflaged war’ activities by counter-offensive
moves of the same kind, it would be wiser to devise and pursue a more subtle and farseeing counter-strategy. In any case, those who frame policy and apply it need a better
160
understanding of the subject than has been shown in the past.

In Vietnam there were glimmers of success, however. Primarily, these could be
seen in the Special Forces, CAPs (Combined Action Program), and CIDG (Civilian
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Irregular Defense Group) programs.161 It was not as though policymakers were unaware
of the changed threat environment; they were just so fixated on mechanized engagements
in the European theater of war as the alternative to global nuclear war.162
Who Was Victorious and Why?
You can kill ten of my men for every one I kill of yours, but even at those odds, you will
lose and I will win.

-Ho Chi Minh163
The U.S. Army was beholden to its “Army Concept” of war, which had envisaged
a mid-intensity, or high intensity conventional campaign, geared toward the use of
technology to carry out its objectives164. Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. has offered that:
While throughout its Vietnam experience the Army encountered a number of signs
indicating that a change in its Concept was required in order to combat the insurgency
more effectively, the Army leadership persisted in approaching the war within the
165
framework of the Concept.

As a result of such biases, resource allocation166 and personnel promotion
incentives167 reflected the Army’s cultural aversion to paramilitary and civilian-led
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efforts at counterinsurgency (e.g. CORDS- Civil Operations and Revolutionary
Development Support)168.
Lessons Learned
Krepinevich contends that “if the Army has learned any lessons from Vietnam, it
has learned many of the wrong ones”169. It isn’t only the Army leadership’s view that is
to blame; it also had to operate in an inauspicious political climate. “In sum, it seems that
the military is more concerned about the intestinal fortitude of the executive and
congressional leadership and the will of the American people than it is about the tough
questions of its own doctrine and force structure”170.
Krepinevich concludes his 1986 study with what would prove to be very prescient
thoughts:
Low-intensity warfare [the realm of guerilla insurgencies] represents the most likely
arena of future conflict for the Army, and counterinsurgency the most demanding
171
contingency.

The paradox that obtains from this prophecy is best stated as follows:
For in spite of its anguish in Vietnam, the Army has learned little of value. Yet the
nation’s policymakers have endorsed the service’s misperceptions derived from the war
while contemplating an increased U.S. role in Third World low-intensity conflicts. This
represents a very dangerous mixture that in the end may see the Army again attempting to
172
fight a conventional war against a very unconventional enemy.
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Evolving Generations of Warfare
Colonel (COL) Thomas X. Hammes makes the case that warfare is not
revolutionary, but evolutionary173. He highlights the First Generation Warfare (1GW)174
as being line and column face-to-face attrition battles, whereas the 2GW had consisted of
massed firepower. The 3GW was focused on maneuver, and 4GW being the current
iteration of warfare as embodied in the low-intensity, unconventional application of force
as a means to achieving political objectives. Hammes argues that the precursors for such
an evolution were demonstrable for the last seventy years, with each successive 4GW
engagement evolving and improving.
T.X. Hammes claims that evolutions in warfare seem to coincide with political,
economic, social and technical changes. In short: as society evolves, so does warfare.
He illustrates how 4GW has continued to evolve from the initial failings and eventual
successes of Mao Tse Tung’s (also written Mao Zedong) People’s War in the 1920s, 30s,
and 40s. Mao had to experience tremendous loss (as exemplified in the “long march”
westward) and learn from it.
In Vietnam the Communists under Ho Chi Minh had successfully implemented
Mao’s strategy against the French in the 1950s and eventually achieved victory over the
U.S. in the decades that had followed. “Changing the correlation of forces” was the
outcome of a campaign focused on the U.S. center of gravity: political will, as a
manipulation of the democratic system through public relations and an intolerable body
count.
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In Nicaragua, the Sandinistas were all but defeated in the early 1960s. Eventually
they had learned from their previous mistakes and began to use public relations,
diplomacy and a deceptive democratic appearance, in order to internally and externally
balance their power. After nearly twenty years, success was achieved.
COL Hammes has indicated how the grassroots successes of the Palestinian
Intifada (Intifada I) in the 1980s-1990s were later reversed in the Second Intifada
(Intifada II, aka- the al Aqsa Intifada, 2001- ?). The key refinement in Intifada I was the
extent to which the message had reached the world that the Palestinians wanted the
Israelis out. This message was lost in Intifada II when it turned into being about the
annihilation of Israel. This was further exacerbated by Arafat and his PLO, who were not
key components of Intifada I and its subsequent evolution.
He also argues that the way the U.S. failed to grasp the 4GW nature of Vietnam is
the same problem the Israelis had in Intifada I. The Israelis, however, were able to learn
(one might even conclude that they had adapted) by the al Aqsa Intifada and began to
counter the Palestinians through the same medium. Hammes asserts that the U.S. has
been stuck on 3GW since WWII, and seems to plan for the current wars the same as it
does the future wars. The theme of Hammes’s book is very clear: The U.S. should have
recognized the symptoms of a change in the nature of warfare, but failed to adapt to
reflect a matching strategy in kind. Instead, the U.S. DOD has been battle-focused, as
opposed to war-focused and has sought technological solutions over human-centric ones.
The most glaring cause for such an adaptation failure seems to be rooted in the nature of
bureaucracies and their consequent inflexibility.
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This leads to another point, which is that the assumption that 4GW as the final
expression of strategy would be foolish and shortsighted. “We have to assume fifthgeneration warfare is out there”.175 In fact, one can already see some evolution toward
that end. China has been focused not only on conventional aspects of military strategy,
but also on the ability to not even engage in armed conflict, hence applying a strategy in
technical terms176.
Three examples illustrate an emerging 5GW: the Chinese attempt to knock out a
satellite in space and the recent compromise of global internet security, which had
reportedly penetrated the U.S. DoD’s system177. The purported Israeli “Stuxnet” cyberattack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is another example of evolution in war-fighting178. Both
China and Israel seem to be gravitating toward a high-tech means of achieving some form
of victory without firing a shot. This does not mean that either state has sought to
eliminate their conventional military means. One final realm has surfaced lately, which
could be viewed, perhaps, as useable under conditions of asymmetry: the “Wikileaks”
debacle and its implications in the national security realm179.
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The U.S. and Iraq (2003- ?)
The United States military entered Iraq on 21 March 2003, in a conventional
combat operation. The primary military objective at hand was of a common,
conventional nature: to destroy the Iraqi military forces and topple the regime of Saddam
Hussein (the latter objective is admittedly less common than the former). Bearing many
resemblances to the previous war of 1991, the United States military (and coalition
forces) prevailed with swiftness. A secondary objective, which would necessarily require
a longer stay, was driven by ideology: to liberate the Iraqi people from tyranny and plant
the seeds of democracy180.
What followed shortly after the initial invasion was anything but conventional.
Asymmetric operations had erupted the very next day181. As Iraqi military units began to
disappear and dissolve into the civilian population, the U. S. military found itself
increasingly facing an unanticipated irregular threat: guerilla war. Until the end of 2006
the U.S. political leadership and most of the military hierarchy had been tenaciously
recalcitrant and dedicated to a mismatched conventional strategy. There were, however,
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dissidents within the military (active and retired) and academia, whose voices were
suppressed until the obvious became intolerable182.
What is interesting for this paper is not that the American administration and
military leaders were so spellbound by their conventional “wisdom”, but that they
remained so in spite of overwhelming evidence that the policy was impotent and the
strategic objectives were far-fetched. In ways similar to the above discussion of the
pitfalls of intelligence adaptation failure, there seems to be a constant principle at play.
Namely, that until a past failure is perceived, cultural and cognitive rigidity will inhibit
future adaptation. Perhaps it could be said that one way to overcome this handicap
requires that an appreciation of its presence is invoked by a sense of humility, and
sustained by learning the correct lessons. This principle does not alone account for
adaptation failure (or success), but may serve to describe the conditions under which
policy and strategy re-align with reality. That being said, there are other matters with
which to contend, that speak more to the core of this paper’s focus.
As was discussed in chapter two, the IC is a tool for serving policy needs. As for
the role of force, Clausewitz had long ago instructed that, “war is not merely an act of
policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political intercourse, carried on
with other means”183. However, if policymakers are beholden to a faulty policy, then the
application of military means toward those ends are bound to produce failure. In other
words, if military leaders are pursuing a military strategy that complements an unrealistic
set of policy aims, it is doubly damaging. Therefore, the policy and/or the strategy for
182
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achieving it (the application of force in the case of Iraq) must adjust to bring means and
ends into harmony. In 2003- 2006 Iraq, it appears that this point was nearly lost, whereas
in 2006- 2007 it was discovered. What it took to adapt and steer away from complete
failure follows.
Elements of Military Adaptation Failure (and Success)
The question remains: why the adaptation failure from 2003- 2006? Further, what
mechanisms allowed for adaptation success in the period 2006- 2007. Here we can delve
into the realm of the military set of organizations that operate in a competitive
environment, but not at the risk of discounting the political decisions, which caused the
military to become engaged. The military organizational learning process will be
explored first, particularly that of the army. One possible misinterpretation must briefly
be addressed. The author is not suggesting that when one form of warfare is dominant, it
will always be so. Rather, if an adversary’s use of a potent form of warfare has achieved
certain political objectives, or is successful in blunting the objectives of another, it should
be recognized as a force (not the force) to be countered in future engagements.
As previously mentioned, the initial invasion of Iraq had appeared to be
successful. As the Iraqi military had realized that it could not parry the coalition advance
through conventional means, a different set of tactics had to be chosen, embodied in
guerilla warfare. Guerilla warfare is not merely a regimen of routine tactics, but a
strategy for addressing and counterbalancing the inequitable distribution of force
mechanisms (men/women, materiel, technology, etc.).
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Concerns regarding budget cuts and the attendant perceived diminution in
importance for the organization are primal fears.184 Military organizations are naturally
defeat-averse and would only seek to avoid changes viewed as detrimental to the overall
health of the organization. Further, James J. Wirtz states that “it is unlikely that
organizations will develop measures of effectiveness that call into question the version of
their own identity to which they are obsessively attached.”185
Wirtz offers some insight into the history of the U.S. counterinsurgency school of
thought. “A ‘never again’ school emerged, especially within the U.S. Army, which
identified counterinsurgency and nation-building efforts as detrimental to the interests of
the United States in general and the U.S. military in particular.” 186 This emphasizes the
issue of “culture” in military thinking. He argues that in applying the principles of
Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR), security should receive a
relatively superior weight. Wirtz also suggests that a chief underlying impediment to
implementation of SSTR is found in the bureaucratic nature of military organizations, as
“they are deeply influenced by their operational/strategic ‘essence’- an agreed-upon body
of concepts that informs members about organizational culture and missions.”187
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The first three years of the American occupation of Iraq could be said to have
been a complete disaster. More than anything else, two causal factors seemed to have
been ever-present: the interests of national security bureaucrats and the nature of
bureaucratic organizations (from Zegart’s points regarding adaptation failure). As for
the first point, there is evidence that political affiliations had been a potent force driving
decisions from the top-down. This theme is a constant in Rajiv Chandrasekaran’s
Imperial Life in the Emerald City188.
The possibility that an insurgency would erupt following conventional combat
operations was not unanticipated. While willfully ignoring the State Department’s
“Future of Iraq Project” (which addressed the possibility for a prolonged occupation and
reconstruction effort), the Bush administration had applied downward pressure to see to it
that the report would not receive serious consideration.189
As for the nature of bureaucratic organizations, it is instructive to recall the level
of resistance that was- and had remained- culturally embedded in the military,
particularly the U.S. Army during and after Vietnam. The “American army was not a
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learning institution during its involvement in Vietnam but was in fact organizationally
disposed against learning how to fight and win counterinsurgency warfare.”190
Failing to appreciate guerilla insurgency as a strategy, is to render oneself
ineffective in countering it, as “conventional operations by themselves have at best no
more effect than a fly swatter.”191 There are many features that make conventional forces
vulnerable to unconventional tactics and strategy. Robert Taber (the only American
fighting alongside Fidel Castro in the defense of Playa Giron) has highlighted many of
the weaknesses of the conventional military when they are engaged with a guerilla
enemy192. They cannot all be addressed here; however, awareness of the existence of just
a few of them shows how much adaptation would be required in order to meet an
insurgency on equal terms.
•

“the guerilla has the initiative; it is he who begins the war, and he who
decides when and where to strike”193

•

“The military has extensive holdings to protect”194
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•

“The guerilla has the freedom of his poverty”195

•

Democracies are especially vulnerable as they “must maintain the
appearance of normalcy; they can be embarrassed out of office. And they
are triply vulnerable because they cannot be as ruthless as the situation
demands. They cannot openly crush the opposition that embarrasses and
harasses them. They must be wooers as well as doers”196

The few (yet incomplete) points mentioned above are merely meant to show how
a conventional modern army is faced with an enemy that is able to manipulate all
elements of the political and military environment at a low cost and to good effect. In
order to close the gaps with the guerilla forces, the persistent protection of the population
is the only corresponding approach; for acting like a guerilla will be morally
unacceptable and politically infeasible. This is very much counterintuitive for a modern
army that is understandably indoctrinated to fight and win wars on a modern battlefield
with the most advanced technology and equipment. Yet, it is this uncomfortable exercise
in unconventional thinking that produces success.
It is not enough to think differently and act accordingly, but to re-write doctrine
and training in an effort to institutionalize such a(n) (r)evolutionary approach. What
makes matters most difficult is that this must be achieved by convincing or
circumventing the stoic guardians of the norms that are to be contradicted; whose career
incentives are inextricably linked to their existence. Additionally, while cutting through
the seemingly immovable institutional obstructions, the policymakers must be convinced
194
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that the conventional norms no longer apply and are apt to generate assured defeat. This
was the environment in which GEN Petraeus and his merry band of Ph.D.s had thrust
themselves.
Turning the Tide: Surging against the Insurgency
As was alluded to earlier in this chapter, the conventional application of force was
not a winning strategy against the guerilla-style insurgency. In order to truly adapt to the
enemy’s strategy a political primer had to open the way for a bold, yet organizationally
and doctrinally antithetical approach. Much of the process and progress, as well as the
obstacles to adaptation have been well documented. This paper now turns to the manner
in which the required steps were taken to overcome them. Much of the following is
drawn from the honest accounting that Thomas E. Ricks has given in his most recent
book entitled, The Gamble: General Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in
Iraq, 2006-2008.197
There were a few strands of influence at play that seemed to have created the
conditions for adaptation success. First, the political, then the organizational, and finally
the doctrinal adaptation had to take root; in that order.
As previously addressed, the decisions that policymakers are tasked with should
guide all other instruments of state power (be it military, intelligence, diplomacy, etc.).
In chapter two this was illustrated by the policymaking-intelligence community
relationship. In this chapter, the significance of a top-down approach –from the
197
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uppermost echelons of political power down to the military chain-of-command and
ultimately to the soldier on the ground –becomes clear.
A couple of political decisions had served as a major hindrance to success on the
battlefield. First, not only did American political prerogatives cause the military to be
involved, but they then shaped and fueled the insurgency. The evidence for this assertion
is rather plain to see: Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Order Number 1 (16 May,
2003) for “De-Baathification of Iraqi Society” and CPA Order Number 2 (23 May,
2003) Dissolution of Iraqi Entities (including the Iraqi Army). Such decisions were taken
arbitrarily by L. Paul Bremmer III (in charge of the occupation of Iraq). It isn’t clear if
he had received the green light to do so, but he certainly was warned by military leaders
and the CIA station chief that the effect would be the creation of armed, trained,
unemployed, dis-empowered, angry Iraqis on the order of tens of thousands.198
Secondly, Secretary of Defense (SecDef) Donald Rumsfeld had not only erred in
trying to suppress opposition to his own doctrinal preferences, but had appeared to be so
refractory that he became perhaps the biggest obstacle to the requisite adaptation. With
the hierarchical structure of the military, it was an impermissible course of action for
sitting generals to criticize policy. This took a different set of actors altogether. It took
the status and prestige of those who would not suffer the consequences of challenging the
SecDef, the military establishment, and most importantly, the president and his
administration, to surmount the seemingly insurmountable political obstacles.
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General (GEN) Jack Keane (ret.) had the courage, wisdom, and gumption to
pursue the top-down politico-military powers-that-be in order to break the strategic
inertia.199 Once he had gotten the ball rolling, his supporting cadre of retired generals
(also having nothing to lose but face) had begun to publicize their dissent.200 This had
the force and effect of generating political pressure toward ousting Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld201 and taking up the strategy of COIN.
Having cleared the way and provided political cover to jump the chain-ofcommand GEN David Petraeus was enabled to step into the commanding role that would
set the climate, and force upon the military –in a top-down fashion –the requisite cultural
change (read: adaptation) to meet the insurgency’s strategy. To do this, he sought (in an
iconoclastic fashion) to assemble the most inclusive list of participants in the process and
implement a most counterintuitive doctrine.202
The mere fact that GEN Petraeus had been a COIN practitioner in his previous
tour in Mosul was not in and of itself his most definitive contribution. Rather, it was his
ability to break with military tradition and convene a meeting on 23-24 February 2006, at
the U.S. Army School of Advanced Studies (Ft. Leavenworth, KS) 203 that would include
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humanitarian experts, academics, COIN gurus, media elements, and critics of the war and
its conduct.204 This key meeting would serve as the final revision of the COIN doctrine,
as embodied in Field Manual 3-24.205
A common theme running through the above-cited works by Ricks, as well as the
updated FM 3-24 is of great significance to this paper: Politics appear to be both the
obstacle, and the propellant that either inhibits or serves the interest of adaptation,
respectively. At the level of the top policymaking personalities, the sense of humility and
flexibility seem to have combined with a better appreciation of reality to produce the
most favored political conditions for adaptation. It wasn’t until GEN Jack Keane and a
number of academics and colonels had made it clear to both President Bush and Defense
Secretary Robert Gates (Rumsfeld’s replacement) that the strategy of simply transitioning
power to the Iraqis would not accomplish either the goals of democratizing Iraq, or
exiting honorably from that country.206
No less an important persistent theme, is that related to the adaptation that had to
take root within both the upper echelons of the military bureaucracy, and the
organizationally resistant army itself. This pursuit also required the same successful
adaptation attributes as had applied to the aforementioned political realm. What is more,
the army had to become a learning organization and overturn many of the dearly held
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and culturally embedded tenets of military operations and tactics.207 Thomas E. Ricks
reminds us of this salient point:
The biggest single strategic change in Iraq in 2007, the one that preceded all others and
enabled them, may also have been the least noticed one: a new sobriety in the mind-set of
the U.S. military. It wasn’t just the Bush administration that had taken years to face
reality in Iraq. The military also was slow to learn.208

Even after operational planning began to reflect the necessary jointness among the
service branches, it was not devoid of organizational parochialism209:
Concerned that the shift to irregular challenges would lead to a cut in its force structure
and budget, the Air Force proposed a greater reliance on airpower in activities like
counterinsurgency. As so often in the past, service interests were transmuted into
strategic debates.210

Further,
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Just as the military has difficulty breaking away from its “big war” mentality, the State
Department’s organizational culture tends to focus on diplomacy rather than the
211
reconstruction or transformation of other states.

In order for such an adaptation to take place, the “strategy vacuum”212 in the
White House had to be reconciled. Still, GEN Petraeus had to contend with the ego of
his CENTCOM (Central Command) Commander, Admiral William Fallon and engage
the “bureaucratic infighting” among the JCS213. The fact that these obstacles had to be
bypassed represented for Admiral Fallon and the JCS an alarming prospect: that the
chain-of-command was circumvented, and consequently rendered impotent. The
psychological discomfort associated with this approach had been difficult to swallow.
This radical break with tradition was the only way forward.
As alluded to earlier, Amy B. Zegart has asserted that the rational self-interest of
policymakers is an enduring reality. This was evident beyond the bureaucratic realm and
was indeed a matter that had placed congressional democrats in a political catch-22.
While they could publicly oppose the war, they could not afford to appear to be
unsupportive in funding the troops and being ultimately responsible for any disastrous
failure that might attach.214
Chapter Summary
The discussion in this chapter was aimed at addressing the obstacles to adaptation
success by process tracing. One key theme that emerges here is that the comfort of a
standard-bearing doctrine can, over time, lapse into intellectual torpor. This is further
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compounded by organizational hubris and strategic atrophy. The cure seems to be similar
to what Richard K. Betts (cited earlier) referred to as the unrealistic solution of having a
president who likes to be challenged, while being given the unvarnished truth without the
threat of political reprisal against the messenger.215
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Chapter 3: Conclusion

For national security and defense matters, the organs that extend policy to its
purported objectives are by definition organizations. If policy objectives are clear and a
coherent strategy has been devised in earnest, normatively speaking, the intended
outcome should be a success. However, when policy (Grand Strategy) objectives are
unrealistic and/or the strategy developed for their implementation is inappropriate to suit
the task, there exists an inherent deficiency in the means-ends continuum. This paper
was formed with the express purpose of establishing where some deficiencies have
developed between policymakers and two broad instruments of state power; namely, the
Intelligence Community and the military.
The first chapter began by briefly describing the emerging threat environment that
had been developing for some time, which had climaxed in America having experienced
its most destructive attack in history. 216 The substantive matter that followed was an
attempt to build on Amy Zegart’s work. By accepting the basic tenets of her work there
was a conscious effort to go further and separate some of the cognitive barriers from the
systemic constructs that advanced causal pressures, ultimately contributing to failure.

216
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The systemic view did reveal some points of friction along the IC-policymaking
line. Having examined two cases (Iraq 2002-3 and Iran 1979), by way of Robert Jervis’s
research, it became clear that though intelligence failures appear on the surface to be a
product of the IC, it is not enough to simply lay blame at the doorstep of the organs of
intelligence. Rather, it was necessary to expose the relational elements that appeared to
be in operation between policymaking and intelligence production.
The second substantive chapter dealt with military cultural and doctrinal
stagnation. It is hoped that the chapter was successful in elucidating the pathway from
stasis to rapid change. The engine of adaptation was a necessary, but cautious, break
with deeply embedded institutional norms. Kalev I. Sepp summarizes this concept best
when he says, “American military strategic culture has retarded the transition of military
operations from conventional to unconventional warfare.”217 Furthermore:
In actuality American military culture is grounded in the simple principals of firepower
and mass. Mirroring both strengths and a notable weakness of the broader American
society, its military forces are highly reliant on technology and logistics, and generally
ignorant of cultures beyond their borders.218

The process of becoming adaptable was not only a departure from military
tradition, in that a strategy that ran counter to what was familiar and comfortable would
be displaced by a paradoxical set of newly learned principles. There was also a sense that
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the standard chain-of-command itself had stood in the way, in some cases all the way to
the highest political levels.219
Strategy Deficit220
… after 9/11… suddenly the foundations of the world had shifted a little bit, where the
focus on conventional transformation, high technology, rapid maneuver, all these things
that were known as the revolution in military affairs, people talked about just before 9/11,
seemed to be a little less relevant to the environment than what we’ve seen now. And
some people have described this as a counter-revolution in military affairs, led to a
certain extent by David Petraeus.

–David Kilcullen221
As was discussed earlier, the paradigmatic paralysis that perpetuated throughout
the decade following the Cold War was suddenly jolted into consciousness on 11
September, 2001. No longer were the competing theories for peacetime engagement and
retrenchment relevant options. America was in a state of shock, followed by a new
opportunity. The new circumstances that were forced upon the United States provided an
opening through which a narrow strategic focus could materialize. As any good strategy
would be incomplete without a military component, a global martial response was
devised to eliminate threats (both real and imagined) that had yet to develop.
For better or for worse, America assumed a preventive strategic posture in that
she could not bear the thought of another surprise attack of such a magnitude. Perhaps
219
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one of the greatest tragedies, aside from the death and destruction unleashed on that
fateful day, was the zeal with which strategic choices were made at the cost of lucid
thought. The old adage that “haste makes waste” is descriptive of the period that
followed. It is common guidance that one should not make important decisions when one
is angry. America needed a focal point; a monolithic entity toward which channeled
enmity could have a sharpening effect on policy. America needed a strategy.
Naturally, the most comfortable approach to problem solving is that which is most
familiar222. At the political level this was accomplished by asserting that an “axis of evil”
was hard at work, planning America’s downfall. At the same time, a linkage was drawn
between rogue states’ leaders’ capabilities and terrorists’ intentions. The logic was all
too fallible,223 yet it would suffice for the time being in that domestic support ran high for
the president.
That policymakers lacked vision and clarity is not so much the point of this paper.
Rather, it is the policy choices that are made under new threat conditions, and what the
resultant revelations tell us about adaptability. Whether policy thinking properly guides
the IC and the military is of some interest. Still, whether intelligence and military means
are suitable in supporting strategy ends is the perpetual question explored in this paper.
These questions are not enough to inform the student of international relations as
to the origins of failure. For this to be better understood it has been a central focus of this
paper to look at intelligence failures and military failures through the various mechanisms
that link them to strategic failure. This paper asserts that failing to adapt to an ever222
223
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evolving threat environment seems not only to be prevalent with regard to the
Intelligence Community-policymaker nexus, but also within the politico-military
relationship. That similar causal forces seem to breed circumstances in which adaptation
failure may result says something about the potentiality of corrective prescriptions that
seek to forestall future failures. In other words, while it is easy to conclude that a
reorganization of the IC would help to thwart future surprise attacks it isn’t quite so
simple.224 Additionally, to employ an incongruous military strategy to meet a strategic
task is tantamount to committing to failure.
In order to gain insight into the underlying motivational biases that guide
behavior, the levels of analysis in this work ranged from individual (key personalities) to
group (organizational tendencies), and even systemic (polarity and paradigm-shifting)
dynamics. The concept that truly gave life to this paper -and formed the arguments
therein -may be illustrated best (though admittedly in a lengthy quote) by Dr. Metz:
The Iraq conflict showed the degree to which idiosyncratic factors influence strategy. It
comes as no surprise that personalities matter greatly. Had not George W. Bush been
president and Donald Rumsfeld secretary of defense, the 2003 intervention would have
been much less likely, probably impossible. But organizational idiosyncrasies matter as
well. In the 1990’s each of the U.S. armed services promoted its own vision of the future
security environment to shape defense transformation to their institutional advantage. For
a variety of reasons, the Air Force and the Navy dominated. This lead to the Joint Vision
model of transformation. The Army was dragged along, stressing that it too could
perform with speed and precision rather than arguing that speed and precision were not
panaceas for all security problems. As a result, when the U.S. military found itself in a
type of conflict not amenable to speed and precision firepower-counterinsurgency-it was
unprepared.
The Iraq conflict demonstrated that Americans remain more comfortable with
technological, operational, and tactical innovation than with strategic adaptation.225
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This extends well beyond the military’s inter-service rivalry and bureaucratic
bickering. The strategy deficit alluded to above is rooted at the political level:
When faced with challenges, the United States tends to reorganize and create new
programs rather than alter or reconceptualize its strategy. In a broader sense, the Iraq
conflict showed that outside the military, there is a dearth of strategic thinking and
planning in the U.S. government. The National Security Council is not configured for
developing true strategy with both a horizontal and vertical dimension. It formulates
policies. While the State Department once had an impressive strategy-making capability
in its Policy Planning Staff, there is little sign that the current manifestation of this plays
anywhere near the role that its Cold War predecessor did when it included people like
George Kennan and Paul Nitze.226

The U.S. national security apparatus created after WWII emerged under
competitive organizational conditions.227 Although it may not have been the most ideal
arrangement, communism presented an identifiable threat and the Soviet Union a
distinguishable enemy. Further, such clarity had made the strategy of containment rather
simple to understand and implement. Grand Strategy was nearly as straightforward in
that the instruments of state power were arrayed in support thereof. After the Cold War
had ended –and more so after 9/11 –the multifarious and diffuse nature of global
terrorism has obscured the landscape in which threats had appeared.
This paper began with the notion that a failure to adapt characterizes both the
IC’s response to a global menace and the military’s late reaction to a loosely aligned
threat in the CENTCOM theater of combat. Like Amy B. Zegart’s explanation of the
contributory factors related to the former, there are at least some causal resemblance in
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the latter. When the two are juxtaposed for examination, it appears that both seem to
suggest a paucity of strategic vision;228 the umbrella under which they tend to huddle.
The three “enduring realities” that Zegart had claimed were responsible for the
purported “intelligence failures” appear to have also played a similar role in the initial
military failures that followed. Recalling the triumvirate Zegart postulated:
… I argue that agency adaptation failure can be attributed to three enduring realities: (1)
the nature of organizations, which makes internal reform exceedingly difficult; (2) the
rational self-interests of political officials, which work against executive branch reform;
and (3) the fragmented structure of the federal government, which erects high barriers to
legislative reform.229

Although they appear in slightly different form in the military realm, the
principles remain operational. Extrapolating from this explanatory model, the previous
chapter sought to illustrate the first of these three points. On the second point, the term
“political officials” could be replaced with any number of variables that reflect the
obstructing personalities (and their resistance to change) within the Defense Department.
The third point is best illuminated as follows:
… through the ‘military-industrial complex,’ a substantial portion of the American
economy, and numerous jobs in almost every congressional district, are linked to the
production of conventional war-fighting capacity. It takes factories, jobs, and industrial
facilities to build battleships and bombers, but aid workers, linguists, and Special Forces
operators are vastly cheaper and do not demand the same industrial base. So shifting
spending priorities onto currently unconventional forms of warfare would cost jobs and
votes in the congressional districts of the very people who control that spending.230
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The above suggests a strategy trap, particularly as organizations become wedded
to the resources that support the strategy; thus making the emergence of a different
strategy for a different set of problems that much more difficult. One final theme that
runs parallel with the foregoing is that, “All strategic possibilities (perhaps even the longdiscredited scenario of territorial warfare in Europe) must be taken into account, and
defence spending must not be allowed to become victim to strategic fashion.”231 This
point is important because it highlights the shortsightedness of strategic thinking and
resource allocation.
There is no strategic panacea suggested here. National security threats will likely
continue to emerge, evolve and transform in infinite ways. In order to effectively
respond and adapt in a timely fashion it is necessary that policymakers and their
bureaucratic subordinates be flexible and subdue political prerogatives in the interest of
national security. Warning: if strategic choices are guided by zeitgeist, foresight will
inevitably suffer. The result could be costly and deadly.
Policy Implications and Some Suggestions
Replicating the precise conditions under which success and failure had obtained is
impossible. However, there are some policy implications and a few suggestions that flow
from them that deserve some brief discussion.
Conveying policy priorities and their underlying logic: Given the repetitive
miscommunication between policymakers and the IC, there appears to be a bilateral
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misunderstanding. That policy-makers have certain intelligence priorities is insufficient
without a deeper understanding of why they seek what they seek. This circumstance is
apt to produce assumptions that the managing authorities in the IC may be compelled to
make in the absence of an adequate understanding. Further down the intelligence cycle
this could lead to misguided collection.
Therefore, one suggestion is that more attention be paid to why certain
intelligence is sought. The difficulty in so doing may cause conflict and an appearance of
acting outside of the IC’s appropriate subordinate role. Still, if one were told to search
for a needle in a haystack it may help to understand the needle’s significance to the
requesting party.
Understanding one’s own fallibility and the frailty of human cognition: Whether
applied to the policymaker, the analyst, or the management betwixt the two, recognizing
the limits of perception is not an easy task. Tenacious attachment to any concept may
inadvertently satisfy the desire to maintain cognitive consistency, while reinforcing
obsolete policies or assumptions. This comes at a heavy cost to sound judgment for both
the IC and the military, as well as their political principals.
Perhaps it would be wise to have a class of honest truth-sayers at hand to
moderate what may tend to look like the work of soothsayers. In other words, if
disinterested advisers were made available to review the most important evaluations and
decisions that were made then perchance the probability of failure might be diminished.
Flexibility must not be overlooked as an essential ingredient in adaptation: The
more rigid a policy or doctrine, the less accommodating it will be. The same is true for
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the personalities that uphold it. What stood out most as a common theme throughout this
paper was the personal attachment (and their attendant vested interests) that some key
individuals had to policies that were failing. This remained constant until more flexible
personalities or paradigms were introduced.
One possible solution to this problem would be to follow the pathway that GEN
Petreaus has so clearly pioneered. For instance, not only did he have the courage to risk
his meritorious career in order to avert the disaster that shortsighted and inflexible
policymakers had triggered. He also had changed the promotion criteria for his
subordinates to reflect the value of thinking “outside the box” and being bold and
creative, rather than “toeing the line.” The IC could benefit from such personnel
practices as well.
The continued misallocation of necessary resources may only serve to undermine
adaptation to future threats as they emerge: As was alluded to numerous times
throughout this paper, the promotion of expensive technologically superior implements of
intelligence gathering and war-fighting do not promise to deliver that which only the
human can. What should be clear by now is that a group of dedicated warriors with small
arms can be a very effective adversary.
In answering an intelligence question, there is no replacement for a linguistically
well-versed HUMINT asset on the ground. For example, detecting the presence of a
military unit is not as significant as learning about that unit’s structure, morale, training
and key personalities. If the center of gravity for a COIN campaign is the population,
bombs and bullets will fail to convey the message that only a human can.
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In sum, it is useful to highlight precisely what the changed threat environment
means to the world’s only remaining superpower: “For the first time in history, great
power does not bring security. It is now the weak who threaten the strong.”232
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Appendix
A Word on the INTs:
In order to better understand “intel-speak”, one must understand that the means of
collection for the IC are separated into two very distinct categories of acquisition:
TECHINT (Technical Intelligence) and HUMINT (Human Intelligence). TECHINT is
further subdivided into subgroups, such as SIGINT (Signals Intelligence) and the subsets
ELINT (Electronics Intelligence), TELINT (Telemetry Intelligence) and FISINT
(Foreign Instrument Signals Intelligence) and so on. IMINT (Imagery Intelligence) and
MASINT (Measures and Signatures Intelligence) are commonly heard terms and form a
central part of the TECHINT spectrum.
HUMINT (Human Intelligence) is the human penetration of a target
state/organization for the purposes of discovering secrets. This consists of further contact
with a member(s) of the target state/organization who can be massaged for actionable
information that would fill in intelligence gaps (or corroborate other intelligence sources)
regarding capabilities, and more importantly, the intentions of the target
state/organization. Motives for human assets are generally said to be a result of financial
gain, disaffection with the regime/organization, promise of asylum, and sometimes a
deceptive ploy by the target state/actor, producing a double agent. This sort of
intelligence work is often romanticized about in spy novels.
There is another area of intelligence gathering that is arguably very accurate:
OSINT (Open Source Intelligence). Intelligence analysts, academics, policymakers, and
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the avid reader with an interest in such matters can often glean significant intelligence
from OSINT. This may be a double-edge sword, as the following example illustrates:
In 1951 he [DCI Walter Bedell “Beetle” Smith] enlisted the services of a group of able
and qualified academicians from one of our large universities for some summer work. To
save their time he furnished them publications, news articles, hearings of the Congress,
government releases, monographs, speeches, all available to anyone for the asking. He
then commissioned them to determine what kind of an estimate of U.S. military
capabilities the Soviets could put together from these unclassified sources. Their
conclusions indicated that in a few weeks for work by a task force on this open literature
our opponents could acquire important insight into many sectors of our national defense.
In fact, when the findings of the university analysts were circulated to President Truman
and to other policymakers at the highest level, they were deemed to be so accurate that
the extra copies were ordered destroyed and the few copies that were retained were given
233
a high classification.

The reason the distinction between HUMINT, TECHINT, and OSINT is made
here is two-fold. First, illuminating the various means of intelligence acquisition is
useful in that many of the sources of contention within the IC may be attributed to
interagency bickering and political maneuvering over budget, turf, and organizational
relevance centering on the purported strengths and weaknesses of the various subordinate
INTs. Secondly, to place in context the voices of reform, as they may represent certain
interests that place them in a position of bias.
For example, CIA is divided into four functional directorates: DI (Directorate of
Intelligence), NCS (National Clandestine Service, formerly the DO [Directorate of
Operations]), DS &T (Directorate of Science and Technology), and DS (Directorate of
Support). The DI is where the analysts reside, and the NCS is where operators practicing
the tradecraft of HUMINT reside. Between the DI and the NCS the cultures are very
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different; it is as though they speak different languages. Naturally, their interests are as
disparate as their duties.
NSA (National Security Agency) deals with IA (Information Assurance),
research, and SIGINT. By law, the head of NSA is a four star Air Force General. This
creates the potential for bias, in that it is TECHINT heavy and partially reliant on airbreathing aerial SIGINT platforms.
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